Obo Arada Shawl   May 11, 2009

መሀይሙ ማነው?

ምሁሩ ማነው?

ጽንሐተ ፀገየስ ምንድን ነው?

አርቲስት ይሞታል፡ ኪነት ግና አትሞትም

What is Art? What is Artist?

Frankly speaking, I am not enchanted to memorialize the death of a singer (albeit famous) as to memorialize the death of victims of “Red Terror”. In Washington, DC, on the same day and at the same time, it is reported that only 50 people have attended in memory for the death of victims of the “Red Terror” that was presented by Ali Hussein from Canada whereas there were a thousand attendees for the memory of Tilahun Gessese’s death. What is the art of death? Is it related with God or Life? Although we are neither sure to touch God nor to pinpoint Life, we are certain about death.

I hate to write on a subject I do not know, but on this one on the “art of death”, I need to express my opinion –that of the Art and Artist – although not a professional level but on a cultural basis.

Yemane Baria

This man died in Asmara on December 1997 and hundred thousand Eritreans buried him. It was reported that his burial ceremony was larger than WWM (woldeab wolde mariam), who is considered to be the “father of the Eritrean separation” from Ethiopia. It was puzzling why a singer was given the highest death ceremony. The explanation is as follows:

Yemane Baria (I don’t know his last name) was neither a talented vocalist nor a musician. But he composes his own lyrics.  My question was, how did he become popular without voice and instruments, after all there are many singers with ghost composers behind them but were not or are not famous like him. The answer rests on something else.

Yemane blended love songs with political matters. In this case, the Eritrean population had embraced Yemene’s music despite his deficiency in Auditory Arts. In other words, Yemane packages the feelings and thoughts of ordinary people and had presented it back to them. That was and still should be the art of politics. Politics after all is a relationship between a singer (in the name of ሐፋሽ ) and the government in power.  

Another factor that was much superior to the above elements of his popularity was the fact that Yeman Baria owned nothing. Whatever material or financial he earns from his music, he used to give it back to the poor or to whoever needs help. That by itself is the hallmark of Eritrean cultural struggle. Yemane lived for the people and died for the people. And I believe, that thousands have attended his burial ceremony to say goodbye to their own inner “Art of Death”. The Auditory Art or lack of it has died with Yemane.

The Eritrean people became voiceless and powerless – ብከያንያን አዘራርባ

Yemane’s touching song as far as I am concerned was that “what is the solution now? እሞ ሕጂ’ድአ እንታይ ይገበር has remained unanswered.

Tilahun Gessese

In sharp contrast toYemane Baria, Tilahun was a singer par excellence. Tilahun’s song was targeted to the elites of Ethiopia. I believe that Tilahun neither composed his songs nor did he play musical instruments. Nevertheless, he was popular among all Eathiopians. Why was he popular, one may ask? The answer may lie in his Visual Art.

Tilahun Gessesse may not have been a political man but his composers were definitely revolutionaries of the time. To prove this sentence, let me narrate two stories.

On one occasion, that is, during the coming of the DERG, Tilahun had a song which runs like this.”Beyond the revolution, I can see a bright hope”ከአብዮቱ በስተ ጀርባ ይታየጝል ብሩህ ተስፋ, and EPRP members and associates were quickly dismissing Tilahun’s false premise. It was very true that Tilahun’s lyrics came from the Ethiopian elites and those of EPRP’s supporters voice of dissent came from the leaders of EPRP. And so the struggle for hope against hope continued until the downfall of the DERG.

On another occasion, while we were sitting in a coffee shop, Ato Berhanu – normally considered as a distributor of “wisdom” entered the coffee shop with the intention of selling a book entitled “the Generation”: a history of EPRP by Kiflu Tadesse. The book-distributor did presented the book to Tesfaye Lemma for purchase to which Ato Tesfaye Lemma rejected the idea of reading a book about EPRP. I asked Artist Tesfaye, whether Tilahun Gessesse was a member of EPRP? He snatched the book from Berhanu and found out that Tilahun’s name was mentioned in a political context. Ato Tesfaye Lemma bought the book and he came back on the third day as happy as he can be. Later on I found out that the man behind Tilahun was Tesfaye himself. I believe that Art has a snowball effect. For this reason, it was no surprise that hundreds of thousands had attended the burial ceremony that was held for Tilahun Gessesse. Even if Tilahun was not a revolutionary per se to speak directly to the Power that be, he has indirectly contributed to the Eway Revolution albeit to the elite class not to the broad masses.

Tsegaye G. Medhin (DEBTERAW)

Performing Art is a combination of Auditory and Visual or it is an Art by itself. DEBTERAW belongs to this category of Art. Alternatively, DEBTERAW even though he is from an elitist class, he speaks the language of the people, he empathies with the people and he gives them back their true cultural identity. Above all DEBTERAW speaks to Absolute Power regardless. DEBTERAW owned nothing of material but he gave everything political, philosophical and spiritual to everyone and everybody. He calls such act as ኪነት የሕዝብ ናት not the “art of death”. DEBTERAW highly believes in CREATIVITY as opposed to carbon copy.

Conclusion

What is the difference between honoring a normal death and a victimized death? I have witnessed heroic deaths. I have also seen cowardly deaths. But they all are deaths or are they really? Apart from going to Heaven or to Hell, there is a criterion to judge by the way the deceased should be evaluated. I believe that death for some, it is heroism and for others it is patriotism. Yemane’s Art belongs to heroism while that of Tilahun reflects of patriotism.

Of course, it is anybody’s guess about DEBTERAW; it is both heroism and patriotism.

Tilahun may have had at heart – songs about Love-Family-Friendship, while that of DEBTERAW and Bariaw is about Liberty-Unity-Justice.

Of course, the triangle of love-family-friendship for DEBTERAW precedes the triangle of LUJ (liberty-unity-justice). It is a big CHOICE WE ALL SHOULD MAKE. At this junction of Eathiopian history, we cannot go back talking about sexuality, false unity and fake friendship. Instead let us dwell on liberty, unity and justice for all.

TRUTH WILL PREVAIL

For comments and questions

woldetewolde@yahoo.com

PS:

I have witnessed a party celebration for the dead. Three days of music with traditional dancing was carried out in Metekel Awraja, in Godjam among the Shankala people. Without my calculated intention, I landed among the celebrating population. Children were suckling and dancing at the same time, naked men and women compete for show. Some sit while others walk but all dance to the tune of the oncoming music that seems to come from nowhere.

I had asked the occasion for the celebration. I was very much in shock when they told me it was because a certain lady had died. I was puzzled why an entire community dances instead of mourning. Would you not ask the question I asked? Of course, you would.

The answer lies in the marital status of the deceased. If the deceased has children, he is parted with pomp and drink, if without children; the community burns the village and relocates. What a wonderful act of “Art of death?”

Should we mourn for Tilahun with twelve children, for Yemane with six children or for DEBTERAW with no children? The answer lies within each one of us.

By Berhanu G. Balcha (Ph.D.)

Comments can be sent to: berhanugbnes@yahoo.com

1. Introduction

Ethnicity and federalism have become the major factors in organizing the political and territorial space in Ethiopia since 1991. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had started its movement for the liberation of its ethnic territory from the central Ethiopian administration, has advocated ethnic- federalism by vowing to reduce conflicts and equalize the diverse ethnic communities. As a result, the overall centralized structure of the previous regime has been replaced by a ‘federal’ system consists of nine ethnically and regionally delimited regional states.

The ‘ethnic- federal’ experiment of devolving public sector powers to ethnic groups goes against the centralized nation-building project of the previous regimes. The previous regimes used a different model; they gave much emphasis to ‘Ethiopian nationalism’ as a unifying concept and promoted centralization rather than regional or ethnic autonomy. The rule of the emperor was based on absolutism and concentration of power on the king himself through a patrimonial network of power, resource and privilege accumulation and distribution system that benefits the rulers and their few collaborators at local, regional and central levels. The major orientation of the imperial state was to use the state power for voracious appropriation of resources mainly from the peasantry in order to reward the few ruling nobilities, viceroy and their clienteles that maintain the survival of the highly centralised state. Although the brutality of appropriation and mode of domination differ from place to place due to the historical process and mode of incorporation into the centralized state structure, the expansion toward the south accompanied with the assertion of the cultural superiority of the core and the serfdom and exploitation of the people of the south (Clapham 2002: 10, Teshale 1995: 176, Bahiru 1994, Messay 1999). In the process, many of the southern Ethiopian peasantry were turned in to serfs in their own land when the ‘ownership’ of their land was transferred to the emperor, nobilities and loyal followers of the imperial authority. Though the predatory state had showed some favouritism based on provincial ethnicity for functional purpose, it promoted ‘state nationalism’ and ‘national integration’ with the perception of national identity as the mirror-image of the ruling elite’s ethnic and cultural manifestations in terms of language, religion and, self-proclaimed moral superiority and military triumph over others. It is indisputable that language proficiency plays a significant role to determine better access to education and employment by putting in a relatively disadvantageous situation those groups whose language is not used in employment and education.

The military regime, after 1974, repeatedly stressed that it preferred ‘socialist’ solution to the nationalities question but promoted militaristic nationalism by means of authoritarian and highly centralized political system. It initiated, however, few measures like broadcasting radio programmes in Afar, Somali, Oromiffa and Tigrgna languages, establishing national research institution for studying nationalities and finally drawing a new internal boundary based on linguistic and territorial bases. Most importantly, it made a radical shift in the landownership in 1975, particularly in the southern part of Ethiopia by destroying the exploitative and unjust land appropriation of the nobility and others. Although the radical change had abolished serfdom by distributing the land to the peasants, land remained the property of the state and thus made the peasantry highly intervened and controlled by the state. Nevertheless, it did not make any attempt to link ethnic rights with politics or governance issues. Rather without any regional or ethnic prejudices, it imposed its greater centralization and brutal governance system, controlled at the core by junior military officers regardless of their ethnic affiliation or orientations. Militaristic state nationalism blended with socialism was promoted by hoping to obliterate regional and ethnic movements. However, excessive centralization backed by ruthless coercion did not abate regional and ethnic movements. Rather, it exacerbated internal turmoil and massive resentment of the population, which provided a good opportunity for the expansion of ethnonational movements that finally overrun the state’s centre in 1991 by defeating the military regime, and introducing a rhetoric of ethnic autonomy and ethnic entitlement.

2. Ethnicity: a theoretical challenge and empirical nuisance

Structuring of society and politics on the basis of ethnicity has been viewed by many scholars as a risky approach for the reason that politicisation of ethnicity could excessively awaken ethnic consciousness and unleash ethnic groupings at the expense of shared identities and interspersed settlements (Horowitz 1985, Messay 1999, Clapham 2002). It is held that ethnic entitlements could give much more leverage to blood relationships and ascriptive loyalties in place of rights and duties (Kedourie 1993). It could also promote the rule of kin, instead of the rule of law, because ascribed ethnic solidarity is more important than merit and other achieving qualities in the ideology of ethnic entitlement, therefore sharing the same genealogy will be a reassurance for assuming political leadership. Ethnic entitlement can also be used by ethnic leaders to gather justification or legitimisation for autocratic rule in the name of their ethnic community. Most importantly, the adulation and preponderance of affinitive or kinship ties within societies would pose formidable barriers to build tolerant multiethnic societies (Ali. A. Mazrui 1967).

On the other hand, scholars concerned about ethnically fragmented societies suggest that in order to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts, it is imperative for multiethnic states to engineer accommodative structure in order to achieve peaceful coexistence (O’Leary 2002, Lijphart 1994; 2002). A prominent scholar in the field of ethnicity, politics and power-sharing in multiethnic societies, Arend Lijphart (1994) advises for designing ethnic power sharing arrangements or consociational model in segmented or divided societies. According to Arend Lijphart that successful political accommodation of diverse ethnic groups could be achieved through recognition and devising appropriate institutions for accommodation and power sharing. In his discussion of consociational politics, Lijphart enumerated four necessary institutional arrangements in accommodating diversities. These are power sharing government (grand coalition), mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977). In his discussion Lijphart outlined the necessity to have proportional representation from all significant groups, a protection for minority groups and a territorial autonomy or non-territorial division of power or functional autonomy. Although Lijphart’s consociational democracy is criticized for its high reliance on the good will of elites, it can be used as a model for engineering appropriate institutional structures in places where diverse ethnic groups are competing and fighting for controlling the state power.

In line with Lijphart’s argument other scholars suggest also that stability in culturally fragmented countries increases if these countries adopt a political system characterised by proportionality, grand coalition, federalism and strong veto points (Steiner et al 2003: 82). Ethnic federalism is suggested as a relatively preferable institutional arrangement in case of geographically concentrated ethnic groups. Federalism can provide an autonomous space for power exercise and a space for expression for territorially concentrated homogeneous ethnic groups. In such case it could reduce demands for separation and other tensions associated with secession.

However, scholars like Donald Horowitz (1985 & 2002) and Basta Fleiner (2000) argue that ethnic arrangement as a means to ensure ethnic self-government could further radicalise ethnic problem by turning ethnic demands into political principles rather than providing a remedy or cure. In this connection, federal framework based on ethnic coalition could be very unstable form of government, because ethnic elites could be possessed by their own sectional self-interest to pull apart the framework or the coalition. They could also be constrained by their ethnic community if they concede much for the sake of cooperation. Horowitz (2002) therefore argues that federalism should aim to create an integrative dynamics by encouraging ethnically heterogeneous groups or political units to work together within a shared structure that can provide incentives for inter-ethnic co-operation. For Horowitz, non-ethnic federal units could help to forge common interests, other than ethnic identities, among people living within the same federal units in order to compete against the other federal units beyond ethnic interests. Horowitz believes that the remedy for ethnic problem is institutionalisation of ‘ethnically blind’ structures and policies that could reduce or undermine ethnic divide. However, he recognises that in a climate of elite competition ‘a fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end and it is also sought for confirmation of ethnic status’ (Horowitz 1985: 187). ‘An ethnic contrast that has produced an extraordinary amount of conflict in many African, Asian, and Caribbean states is the juxtaposition of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ groups’ (Horowitz 1985: 148). Thus, Horowitz advises that ‘if indeed ethnicity and ethnic organisations provide security to groups in an uncertain environment, then attempts to replace or outlaw them may have the effect of increasing insecurity’ (Horowitz 1985: 567-8). It could be essential, therefore, to recognise the importance of power-sharing and territorial devolution. Territorial compartmentalization with devolution of generous power can have tranquillising effects in countries with territorially separate groups, significant sub-ethnic divisions and serious conflict at the centre (Horowitz 1985: 614). It is very vital to consider the importance of timing in engineering a political process and structure, because ‘accommodation long delayed may be accommodation ultimately denied’ (Horowitz 1985: 617).

As Walker Connor (1999) articulates that ethnonational movements’ are found worldwide, they

‘are to be found in Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana), and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries that are old (United Kingdom), as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia), as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada), as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India) and Judaic (Israel). (Connor 1999: 163-4).

Ethnic associations and ethnic parties have been discouraged and banned in many countries and in majority cases due to fear of the presumed radical and destructive backlashes of ethnic demands and ethnic rights. Vindictive horrors of ethnic conflicts, genocide and ethnic cleansing in cases like in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Nigeria and also unrelenting and destructive ethnic strives in places such as in Sudan, India, Malaysian, Sri Lanka and others are signalling the recalcitrance nature of ethnic demands and also indicating the difficult challenges connected to ethnic entitlement and ethnic rights.

However, in his cross-national study of communal based conflicts, Ted Gurr (1994) shows that ‘ethnic identity and interest per se do not risk unforeseen ethnic wars; rather, the danger is hegemonic elites who use the state to promote their own people’s interest at the expense of others (Gurr 2000: 64). Thus, he warns that ‘the push of state corruption and minority repression probably will be a more important source of future ethnic wars than the ‘pull’ of opportunity’ (Ibid). Horowitz also asserts that even if ethnic problems are intractable, they are not altogether without hope; ‘even in the most severely divided societies, ties of blood do not lead to ineluctably to rivers of blood’ (Ibid. p. 682). Power-sharing and coalition political frameworks that could encourage inter-ethnic cooperation by ensuring recognition of some prominent group’s rights could be one option to minimise group’s resentments and mitigate destructive conflicts.

3. A paradox in Ethiopia: a tiny minority and relatively poorer region demands and monopolises federalism

By Teklu Bekele <tbekele@gmail.com>

Introduction:

From the outset I’m deeply worrying about the indifference I observe these days among the vocal Diaspora when it comes to the future of Ethiopia. As audience and on lookers from our comfort residence in Diaspora, we never ask ourselves twice if we are really and critically organized enough to play the role of legitimate substitutes to the incumbent regime in Ethiopia. No matter how bad we may judge its activities and style of governance, are we really doing our homework in preparation for the take over of power in a more structured and convincing manner? Or are we simply shouting to end in power vacuum? Viewed from our current hair-splitting and paradoxical political stand perspectives at least we can fairly admit that TPLF is in a better position as an organized political group in its own way and manners; that befit TPLF’s principal objectives and standings. How about us that oppose the TPLF-governance styles in Ethiopia? We have not yet put our homework in order; we don’t try to compromise and co-exist relating to or organized as a fraternity; we prefer going unilateral without achieving any tangible success story to tell. Are we still expecting a miraculous change to take place in Ethiopia? I leave the likely responses to these paradoxical and open-ended quarries to readers’ own judgments. In what follows let me explain what I mean by Berhanu and Andargachew as the ‘Diaspora Rubble Raisers’.

The Men on the Twilight Zone

These few days the global mass-media was busy telling us about an attempted coup de stat by Ginbot-7 group in Ethiopia. Much has been said by way of comments in different websites too. In connection to this, let me share my own opinions. I may be provocative to most readers but for its own good. If it stings anger or delight in who ever is reading it from what angle; so be it. I think it is time that each reader should really rationalize the case in point and come up with his/her own conclusive judgments than to drift away with the wind in the ocean of emotion laden political discourse. What is critical is how we solve the riddle political puzzle left in our hands. That said let me briefly touch upon the two fellows about whom much is being talked in all corners of discussions these days. It concerns Berhanu Nega Bunger and Andargachew Tsigie of Ginbot-7 political group (hereafter labeled as Gunboat-7). These two fellows traversed their earth shaking political moves from abandoning their trust worthiness to EPRP in the 1970s to becoming TPLF loyalists and pro-Woyane advocating-tugs throughout the 1990s. Their long political muddling march took them through to KINIJIT and ultimately into molding a new terrorist group called Gunboat-7 conspired and organized no where else but under the blessings of the Shaabia leader Issayas Afeworki. To our dismay Berhanu and Andargachew were running in desperation left and right to comfort the Ethiopian Diaspora by working hand and gloves with the Regional God-father of Pirates and fundamental Islamist terrorist-organizer – Issayas Afeworki of Asmara, Eritrea.

Particularly the forked tongue Andargachew, who is characterized as an arrogant political adventurer, was a student at Teferi Mekonen High along with Yared Tibebu of ANDEM. In early 2005, when Berhanu came to London to garner support for his newly formed political party – Keste Demena; the first person he contacted was Andargachew who since then remains on the long political journey to attain their day-dreams and hunger for power through the barrel of Gunboat-7.

The first time when Berhanu and Andargachew made a go at it and joined TPLF, one should recall, they had Africa Group Entrepreneurial mandate at their disposal. Not only did they simply overstep their mandate of running business; but also they overreached themselves by transforming each into a He-Messiah ordained to heal the political pathologies that poor Ethiopia has suffered for decades thus far. Especially when Berhanu followed TPLF in 1991 and entered Addis Ababa as one of its loyalists he was immediately designated as part of the AFRICA GROUP Ltd., an entrepreneurial group designed by TPLF to attract business ideas in the honey moon days in TPLF-Ethiopia. While in AFRICA GROUP Ltd., Berhanu took huge sums of loan from Woyane regime treasury and became an entrepreneur and founded the Ethiopian Agro-Maize, a fertilizer producing company, and Addis Village Family Home Builders. Later he aspired to hold ministerial position but in vain (see note # 1).

In fact, out of sheer personal disappointment of not getting their highly aspired ministerial positions from the TPLF regime, the two fellows dropped KESTE DEMENA; instead they grabbed and hijacked the platform of KNIJIT initially created by Lidetu till Berhanu and Andargachew were taken into jail for causing urban unrest in 2005. Upon his mystical release from captivity Andargachew traveled to Asmara and consulted Issayas Afeworki prior to officially establishing their Gunboat-7 group in Diaspora; and operating in semi-clandestine fashion as those ones orchestrated by Issayas Afeworki and assigned for covert mission inside Ethiopia (see: note# 1).

Andargachew who initially crafted and drafted Article 39 in the current TPLF constitution still remains a diehard advocate of self-determination up to secession of Ogadenia, Oromia and Gambela. That was what he promised to Issayas Afeworki while in Asmara. And that is what Berhanu and Elias Kifle of Ethiopian Review are standing for to this very day as I write. The reason is simple. They believe in realizing nationalities to determine their secession without any challenge. Indeed, no matter what it may cost, the Gunboat-7 group shall fight any one or any thing that stands against Article 39. Both Andargachew and Berhanu are operating against the hardliners of AEUP and EPRP, etc. on this critical national matter. Both of them openly support UDJP and/or Medrek, the coalition made up of loyalist opposition parties with ethnic based agenda who signed on to the TPLF-charter for ethnic-federalism and secession up to self determination (for details see notes # 2).

Worse of all, some among the Ethiopian Diaspora go to the extent of suspecting Berhanu and Andargachew as likely CIA agents. Incidentally, we should not be alarmed about such revelation. These days it is conventional political game and quite natural for any politically motivated group to work hard and come to power in any part of the developing nations by networking with and by way of ensuring their loyalty to CIA if they want to come to and remain on power for a longer period of time. That is exactly what each leader in Africa is doing these days. Those who refuse are sanctioned until they surrender and show their loyalty to the West (especially USA and UK).

A case in point is Issayas Afeworki that is suffering from global isolation for refusing to be part of the CIA-club; consequently in order to draw attention and to secure substantial amount of desperately needed hard currency he has nowadays resorted to training pirates and Islamist fundamentalists who earn him funds, and material support the fluid and feasible way (for details see notes # 3).

Dashed Day-Dreams

Is the Gunboat-7 leadership in Diaspora day-dreaming of climbing up to power in Addis Ababa on the back of those that are toiling and putting their lives on the lime-line against the sharp-shooter TPLF? And if so would some of these generals succeed in any form of grabbing power? Would TPLF relinquish power without much resistance? Do the Gunboat-7 leaders think they will snatch power from these generals upon their arrival at Bole International Airport without any challenge? Let us assume they succeeded in taking over power; how would they sort out critical national issues including the border dispute with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s access to the sea, the ethnically federated regions, the question of Ogden, Oromia, Gambella etc.?

To one’s dismay, Berhanu and Andargachew just don’t get it, no matter what! The world could be changing before their eyes – winds of change would blow right through their nose – and yet they hold onto their good-old worldview with their ‘clock-stop-syndrome’. History – for these 2-people – has stopped at some fixed location in 2005 – spatial and temporal. They believe in a ‘clock stop syndrome’ while living in the midst of mind-numbing motions both at home and abroad. Berhanu and Andargachew of Gunboat-7 preach the gospel of fixture on 2005 to anyone who has the stupidity to listen to them. Often times they have the propensity to imbue their message with messianic fervor. Whatever the discipline they like to indulge in – be it politics, economics or business – they tend to have a penchant for the religious. All their strongest convictions – whether they make friends or enemies – are the stuff of fairytales and their passion for the abstract often gets the better of their worldviews. Quite simply, Berhanu and Andargachew constitute a class of their own. Entitled as they are to their ‘clock-stop syndrome’ worldview, they become sometimes nuisance beyond measure. Their momentary fame seeking coup de stat attempts – as the medium on whose back Berhanu and his street smart comrades were hoping to find themselves in the corridors of power – may immediately have proved just a mirage; nonetheless, they have chosen to cling on to that illusion.

Chanting The Usual May 2005 Election:

The May 2005 election was lasting mantra, and by far the magnum opus of Berhanu and Andargachew’s entire political career. It appears, judging by the hysterical level of deep-seated resentment that is evident in just about every statement both Berhanu and Andargachew make in their public appearances ever since, that role they dreamed through Kinijit back in 2005 was the closest they came to wielding a real enough political power. Four years on, they remain harping on the same good old string as if the entire world had gone down the drain along with their illusory king-making opportunity. The election in May 2010 is approaching while we are singing the same good old 2005 melody to date. How strongly are we prepared this time compared to the 2005 attempts made by various groups? Have we learned from previous mistakes yet?

In my view we are far poorly organized than ever before; disintegrated to work at creating ethnic-led mini-states by setting-up chains of political kiosks spread throughout the world for collecting alms the conventional EPLF-TPLF way. Consequently, what is happening?

At the end of the day, Berhanu and Andargachew maintain a misplaced trust in Ethiopia. Their Gunboat-7 group passion and vision for democracy remains badly ludicrous with the apathy prevalent in Ethiopia. Berhanu and Andargachew put too much emphasis on democracy, which is even hard to put into real action in a very educated and informed society like the USA and Western Europe. So instead of barking on and bragging about war of words on the urgency to topple TPLF through wishful thinking, we would have been blessed if they reconsidered clear-cut solutions for our paradoxical national homework that remains in the hands of the opposition groups with serious, systematic and strategic deliberation. TPLF is doing what is in its priority agenda to execute the way it perceives. We should not expect to incorporate our in it while at the same time remaining intolerant with it. We have to devise ours and find ways and means how to realize it. Indeed it is disappointing to even observe the likes of Berhanu who simply make empty slogans and shouts for momentarily causing havoc in Ethiopia at all costs. Without organizing supporters and sympathizers to potentially be considered as better alternative governing groups; and without impressing the overwhelming majority Diaspora Ethiopians to follow suit with them; simply these fellows continue to muddle and commit same old mistakes. What good does it make to persistently complain and harp on the evilness of TPLF; and continue shouting in bravado for any silly action that may incidentally happen; as if war of words can bring lasting solutions to the country in critical needs for peace and progress?

Only God knows if Berhanu and Andargachew still fancy themselves as someone who can rid Ethiopia of all its ills – in which case they and only they would have been proved totally insane in the membrane. As though to make up for their all too quick descent into the depths of irrelevance, Berhanu and Andargachew luckily have secured a rock-star status and place in a very tiny corner of Ethiopian politics: the clock-stop syndrome caucus of the Ethiopian Diaspora that claim support for Gunboat-7. For both Gunboat-7 and their handful of Diaspora fans, only cynics or those disposed towards the ‘evil-TPLF’ could dissent from the self-evident truths of absolute dictatorship and human rights violations in present day Ethiopia. Apparently, only that – to indulge their questionable wishes and tastes to the Gunbot-7groups – is what constitutes just about everything they are left to do in the way of active politics. In what would amount to a dramatic reversal of role, Berhanu and Andargachew have ironically transformed themselves from an inconspicuous – inconsequential no less – University Professorship and lampoon proletariat respectively into a full-time crusader for the grab-power-by-any-means coalition of Diaspora rubble raisers who have long renounced all sensibility rather choosing to hold tenaciously onto their make-believe world of melt away politics.

It looks as though the laws of physics – that depicts on how like poles repel each other – totally gave way to coincidence in order for similarly charged entities to attract each other in a given magnetic field thereby forming such a strange constellation of resentful -losers – the Berhanu and Andargachew crafted Gunboat-7s. Laughable enough their recent coup de stat attempt at making sense came by way of an interview with the VOA-Amharic program (Part I & II) this month (April 2009). Interestingly, though, Berhanu’s interview – very typical of the kind of sloppy analysis that often boosts the morale of few Diaspora doomsayers – has not received much publicity. Could that be because Berhanu has already outlived his importance even for Gunboat-7 enthusiastic fans? May be yes, may be not. Like Berhanu or despise him, he is a bag of curiosity in his own right; at least a series of his recent radio interview he gave in the USA are.

To say that rigorous analysis has never been Berhanu’s forte is almost to state the obvious. Not surprisingly, the series of radio interviews are all showcases indicating the extent of Berhanu and Andargachew’s anger and the length to which they would go to portray the incumbent government – and harp on the same old TPLF-string in a negative light in anyway they can. To try to focus on all the issues Berhanu and Andargachew raise during their series of radio interviews is very difficult; since most of their talk is downright sloganeering deprived of any substantial solutions whatsoever. They are simply overstuffed with numerous inconsistencies and fallacious claims that I personally refuse to dignify them by their responses. But I think a word or two is well in order to address two topics I believe can mutually exhaust all that can be said of the Gunboat-7 leadership. The first has to do with the version of democracy the likes of Berhanu and Andargachew want to impose on Ethiopia and the mindset that made such arrogance possible in the first place. The second point – also related to the first – has to do with what sort of things the Gunboat-7 leadership thinks – despite the effort to conceal it – Berhanu and Andargachew can and will do to help remove Meles Zenawi’s government and the Gunboat-7’s case for that.

Apart from the usual diatribe against the incumbent regime – most of which was pure sloganeering – the series of their recent radio interviews simply contain a rather childish blather on issues that the two fellows clearly don’t have any grasp whatsoever. Their notion of the process of building democracy could win the Gunboat-7 leadership a name in the annals of the authors of worst political theories. Biting more than they can chew, Berhanu and Andargachew rush back in forth in a mindless rambling all the while drawing strange parallels and making contradictory suggestions in a matter-of-fact ease. For instance, they talk of nationally divisive article-39 stipulated in the incumbent regime’s constitution as legitimate while at the same time talking sustaining of a united democratic Ethiopia. It turns out these two die-hard fellows don’t blink even for a second when it comes to reconciling the irreconcilable; democracy and armed struggle; violence and nonviolence; border dispute with Eritrea; Ethiopia’s legitimate access to the sea through Assab Port; western intervention and independence; the fate of Birtukan Mideksa and what not. Their notions of democracy or freedom are idiosyncratic at best and idiotic at worst. As the series of recent radio interviews reveal Berhanu and Andargachew’s take on the relation between democracy and national stability could have put their fans to shame. As obvious as this patent ignorance is, there must however be a method to their stupidity, if the pattern is any guide. More than anything, the series of radio interviews they give these days reveal tons of materials that point to their eternal marriage with conducting coup de stat or for a take over of power in the notion that the democratic process in Ethiopia can and ought to be remotely controlled by the Western world acting on behalf of Ethiopians (see note # 4).

Living in their comfort zone some ten thousand miles away from Ethiopia Berhanu and Andargachew complain that Europeans and Americans have made it “business as usual with Ethiopia” despite Gunboat-7’s scathing website reports back in the days. The 2-fellows decry the G-8 for inviting PM Meles to their summit “as if he was a respectable leader”. Berhanu and Andargachew hope Barrack Obama will correct the wrongs of his predecessor that they blame for discouraging democracy in Ethiopia. Berhanu and Andargachew claim that George Bush was to blame for what they believe was the reversal of the democratic process, namely – the fact that their power sharing proposal was turned down systematically – because Bush did not force PM Minister Meles to choose democracy over Stability. In parentheses, what does it really mean democracy takes precedence over stability? That democracy can coexist with anarchy? That stability is just an excuse for dictators to cling onto power? It is very difficult to know what exactly these two fellows meant to say; whatever their relentless intentions, however, that kind of idiotic argument is enough to put the two fellows in a class all of their own: they remain in the category of un-teachable political lightweights.

Looks like Berhanu and Andargachew cannot come to terms with the futility of such a bona fide mandate bestowed upon each as the Mayor of Addis Ababa Municipality. They love this title more than any thing else. Berhanu and Andargachew have ever since been tirelessly straining every nerve and muscle to bring what little influence they may have left to bear on the manner the rest of the world conducts itself with the Government of Ethiopia. Now a spent force even in their own chambers, Berhanu and Andargachew seem to have found a consolation of sorts in what they believe is a gathering storm against Meles Zenawi’s government: Gunboat-7 (Berhanu Nega’s May-15 movement). With his Gunboat-7 reports flashed down the toilet as pure nonsense by none other than those who supported their mission in the first place, Gunboat-7’s new-found weapon is an uncanny campaign on behalf of a group of desperados led by their ‘best friend’ Elias Kifle of ER (see note # 5).

But their fanciful rise to the Babylonian heights of king-making was dealt a shattering blow once the two were told they were simply out to grab power by any and by all means. It seems that Berhanu and Andargachew haven’t learned their lessons of Ethiopian history. No amount of domineering by Diaspora Fanatics will ever arm-twist the situation inside Ethiopia into changing the course charted by TPLF by way of remote control from their comfort seats in Diaspora. We should sacrifice ourselves, our time and energy if we want to see change. That was the case yesterday; is the case at the present; and that will always be the case in generations down the road; it means we must force ourselves to delve into doing our home bitter works well enough; before we open our mouths ahead of time. Unfortunately for the good Berhanu and Andargachew, it looks like drawing such lesson has eluded them even four years after that 2005 fateful day of costly gamble has gone once and for all. Throughout the series of recent radio interviews and website reports, they make rather flimsy (or was it phony?) claims that they are going to fight the incumbent regime by all means including waging war. When the real thing comes to the fore, here is Berhanu denying blind-folded as not knowing any of the Gunboat-7 suspects except for one cuisine of his. It is not the superficial disclaimers that matter but the subterranean similarities of their so-called ‘ways out of dictatorship’ for the Ethiopian Opposition with that of Berhanu’s and Andargachew’s protégé-in-exile, Berhanu “Mayor-Elect-of Addis”; Andargachew “X-Mayor of Addis”. That they are working in cahoots with groups with hideous agendas of violence and subversion is anything but hidden. Only the Gunboat-7-people assure all of us to raise our hopes; have the magic wand that can do the tricks in this would-be comprehensive, no-holds-barred Gunboat-7 movement; a harebrained PR stunt Berhanu coughed up to try to explain away his wishy-washy ways of conducting opposition tactics including, but not limited to, waging war against the incumbent regime.

Notes:

1. http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?title=ethiopia_arrests_35_suspects_in_alleged_&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1

2. http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/974#comments;

http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?title=kin_of_exiled_ethiopian_opposition_leade&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1

3. http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/981; http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/978#comments; http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/974#comments;

4. http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/981;

5. http://mahder.com/fishing-in-troubled-waters-elias-kifles-unabated-servitude-to-issaas-afeworki.html

By Teklu Bekele <tbekele@gmail.com>

Introduction:

From the outset I’m deeply worrying about the indifference I observe these days among the vocal Diaspora when it comes to the future of Ethiopia. As audience and on lookers from our comfort residence in Diaspora, we never ask ourselves twice if we are really and critically organized enough to play the role of legitimate substitutes to the incumbent regime in Ethiopia. No matter how bad we may judge its activities and style of governance, are we really doing our homework in preparation for the take over of power in a more structured and convincing manner? Or are we simply shouting to end in power vacuum? Viewed from our current hair-splitting and paradoxical political stand perspectives at least we can fairly admit that TPLF is in a better position as an organized political group in its own way and manners; that befit TPLF’s principal objectives and standings. How about us that oppose the TPLF-governance styles in Ethiopia? We have not yet put our homework in order; we don’t try to compromise and co-exist relating to or organized as a fraternity; we prefer going unilateral without achieving any tangible success story to tell. Are we still expecting a miraculous change to take place in Ethiopia? I leave the likely responses to these paradoxical and open-ended quarries to readers’ own judgments. In what follows let me explain what I mean by Berhanu and Andargachew as the ‘Diaspora Rubble Raisers’.

The Men on the Twilight Zone

These few days the global mass-media was busy telling us about an attempted coup de stat by Ginbot-7 group in Ethiopia. Much has been said by way of comments in different websites too. In connection to this, let me share my own opinions. I may be provocative to most readers but for its own good. If it stings anger or delight in who ever is reading it from what angle; so be it. I think it is time that each reader should really rationalize the case in point and come up with his/her own conclusive judgments than to drift away with the wind in the ocean of emotion laden political discourse. What is critical is how we solve the riddle political puzzle left in our hands. That said let me briefly touch upon the two fellows about whom much is being talked in all corners of discussions these days. It concerns Berhanu Nega Bunger and Andargachew Tsigie of Ginbot-7 political group (hereafter labeled as Gunboat-7). These two fellows traversed their earth shaking political moves from abandoning their trust worthiness to EPRP in the 1970s to becoming TPLF loyalists and pro-Woyane advocating-tugs throughout the 1990s. Their long political muddling march took them through to KINIJIT and ultimately into molding a new terrorist group called Gunboat-7 conspired and organized no where else but under the blessings of the Shaabia leader Issayas Afeworki. To our dismay Berhanu and Andargachew were running in desperation left and right to comfort the Ethiopian Diaspora by working hand and gloves with the Regional God-father of Pirates and fundamental Islamist terrorist-organizer – Issayas Afeworki of Asmara, Eritrea.

Particularly the forked tongue Andargachew, who is characterized as an arrogant political adventurer, was a student at Teferi Mekonen High along with Yared Tibebu of ANDEM. In early 2005, when Berhanu came to London to garner support for his newly formed political party – Keste Demena; the first person he contacted was Andargachew who since then remains on the long political journey to attain their day-dreams and hunger for power through the barrel of Gunboat-7.

The first time when Berhanu and Andargachew made a go at it and joined TPLF, one should recall, they had Africa Group Entrepreneurial mandate at their disposal. Not only did they simply overstep their mandate of running business; but also they overreached themselves by transforming each into a He-Messiah ordained to heal the political pathologies that poor Ethiopia has suffered for decades thus far. Especially when Berhanu followed TPLF in 1991 and entered Addis Ababa as one of its loyalists he was immediately designated as part of the AFRICA GROUP Ltd., an entrepreneurial group designed by TPLF to attract business ideas in the honey moon days in TPLF-Ethiopia. While in AFRICA GROUP Ltd., Berhanu took huge sums of loan from Woyane regime treasury and became an entrepreneur and founded the Ethiopian Agro-Maize, a fertilizer producing company, and Addis Village Family Home Builders. Later he aspired to hold ministerial position but in vain (see note # 1).

In fact, out of sheer personal disappointment of not getting their highly aspired ministerial positions from the TPLF regime, the two fellows dropped KESTE DEMENA; instead they grabbed and hijacked the platform of KNIJIT initially created by Lidetu till Berhanu and Andargachew were taken into jail for causing urban unrest in 2005. Upon his mystical release from captivity Andargachew traveled to Asmara and consulted Issayas Afeworki prior to officially establishing their Gunboat-7 group in Diaspora; and operating in semi-clandestine fashion as those ones orchestrated by Issayas Afeworki and assigned for covert mission inside Ethiopia (see: note# 1).

Andargachew who initially crafted and drafted Article 39 in the current TPLF constitution still remains a diehard advocate of self-determination up to secession of Ogadenia, Oromia and Gambela. That was what he promised to Issayas Afeworki while in Asmara. And that is what Berhanu and Elias Kifle of Ethiopian Review are standing for to this very day as I write. The reason is simple. They believe in realizing nationalities to determine their secession without any challenge. Indeed, no matter what it may cost, the Gunboat-7 group shall fight any one or any thing that stands against Article 39. Both Andargachew and Berhanu are operating against the hardliners of AEUP and EPRP, etc. on this critical national matter. Both of them openly support UDJP and/or Medrek, the coalition made up of loyalist opposition parties with ethnic based agenda who signed on to the TPLF-charter for ethnic-federalism and secession up to self determination (for details see notes # 2).

Worse of all, some among the Ethiopian Diaspora go to the extent of suspecting Berhanu and Andargachew as likely CIA agents. Incidentally, we should not be alarmed about such revelation. These days it is conventional political game and quite natural for any politically motivated group to work hard and come to power in any part of the developing nations by networking with and by way of ensuring their loyalty to CIA if they want to come to and remain on power for a longer period of time. That is exactly what each leader in Africa is doing these days. Those who refuse are sanctioned until they surrender and show their loyalty to the West (especially USA and UK).

A case in point is Issayas Afeworki that is suffering from global isolation for refusing to be part of the CIA-club; consequently in order to draw attention and to secure substantial amount of desperately needed hard currency he has nowadays resorted to training pirates and Islamist fundamentalists who earn him funds, and material support the fluid and feasible way (for details see notes # 3).

Dashed Day-Dreams

Is the Gunboat-7 leadership in Diaspora day-dreaming of climbing up to power in Addis Ababa on the back of those that are toiling and putting their lives on the lime-line against the sharp-shooter TPLF? And if so would some of these generals succeed in any form of grabbing power? Would TPLF relinquish power without much resistance? Do the Gunboat-7 leaders think they will snatch power from these generals upon their arrival at Bole International Airport without any challenge? Let us assume they succeeded in taking over power; how would they sort out critical national issues including the border dispute with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s access to the sea, the ethnically federated regions, the question of Ogden, Oromia, Gambella etc.?

To one’s dismay, Berhanu and Andargachew just don’t get it, no matter what! The world could be changing before their eyes – winds of change would blow right through their nose – and yet they hold onto their good-old worldview with their ‘clock-stop-syndrome’. History – for these 2-people – has stopped at some fixed location in 2005 – spatial and temporal. They believe in a ‘clock stop syndrome’ while living in the midst of mind-numbing motions both at home and abroad. Berhanu and Andargachew of Gunboat-7 preach the gospel of fixture on 2005 to anyone who has the stupidity to listen to them. Often times they have the propensity to imbue their message with messianic fervor. Whatever the discipline they like to indulge in – be it politics, economics or business – they tend to have a penchant for the religious. All their strongest convictions – whether they make friends or enemies – are the stuff of fairytales and their passion for the abstract often gets the better of their worldviews. Quite simply, Berhanu and Andargachew constitute a class of their own. Entitled as they are to their ‘clock-stop syndrome’ worldview, they become sometimes nuisance beyond measure. Their momentary fame seeking coup de stat attempts – as the medium on whose back Berhanu and his street smart comrades were hoping to find themselves in the corridors of power – may immediately have proved just a mirage; nonetheless, they have chosen to cling on to that illusion.

Chanting The Usual May 2005 Election:

The May 2005 election was lasting mantra, and by far the magnum opus of Berhanu and Andargachew’s entire political career. It appears, judging by the hysterical level of deep-seated resentment that is evident in just about every statement both Berhanu and Andargachew make in their public appearances ever since, that role they dreamed through Kinijit back in 2005 was the closest they came to wielding a real enough political power. Four years on, they remain harping on the same good old string as if the entire world had gone down the drain along with their illusory king-making opportunity. The election in May 2010 is approaching while we are singing the same good old 2005 melody to date. How strongly are we prepared this time compared to the 2005 attempts made by various groups? Have we learned from previous mistakes yet?

In my view we are far poorly organized than ever before; disintegrated to work at creating ethnic-led mini-states by setting-up chains of political kiosks spread throughout the world for collecting alms the conventional EPLF-TPLF way. Consequently, what is happening?

At the end of the day, Berhanu and Andargachew maintain a misplaced trust in Ethiopia. Their Gunboat-7 group passion and vision for democracy remains badly ludicrous with the apathy prevalent in Ethiopia. Berhanu and Andargachew put too much emphasis on democracy, which is even hard to put into real action in a very educated and informed society like the USA and Western Europe. So instead of barking on and bragging about war of words on the urgency to topple TPLF through wishful thinking, we would have been blessed if they reconsidered clear-cut solutions for our paradoxical national homework that remains in the hands of the opposition groups with serious, systematic and strategic deliberation. TPLF is doing what is in its priority agenda to execute the way it perceives. We should not expect to incorporate our in it while at the same time remaining intolerant with it. We have to devise ours and find ways and means how to realize it. Indeed it is disappointing to even observe the likes of Berhanu who simply make empty slogans and shouts for momentarily causing havoc in Ethiopia at all costs. Without organizing supporters and sympathizers to potentially be considered as better alternative governing groups; and without impressing the overwhelming majority Diaspora Ethiopians to follow suit with them; simply these fellows continue to muddle and commit same old mistakes. What good does it make to persistently complain and harp on the evilness of TPLF; and continue shouting in bravado for any silly action that may incidentally happen; as if war of words can bring lasting solutions to the country in critical needs for peace and progress?

Only God knows if Berhanu and Andargachew still fancy themselves as someone who can rid Ethiopia of all its ills – in which case they and only they would have been proved totally insane in the membrane. As though to make up for their all too quick descent into the depths of irrelevance, Berhanu and Andargachew luckily have secured a rock-star status and place in a very tiny corner of Ethiopian politics: the clock-stop syndrome caucus of the Ethiopian Diaspora that claim support for Gunboat-7. For both Gunboat-7 and their handful of Diaspora fans, only cynics or those disposed towards the ‘evil-TPLF’ could dissent from the self-evident truths of absolute dictatorship and human rights violations in present day Ethiopia. Apparently, only that – to indulge their questionable wishes and tastes to the Gunbot-7groups – is what constitutes just about everything they are left to do in the way of active politics. In what would amount to a dramatic reversal of role, Berhanu and Andargachew have ironically transformed themselves from an inconspicuous – inconsequential no less – University Professorship and lampoon proletariat respectively into a full-time crusader for the grab-power-by-any-means coalition of Diaspora rubble raisers who have long renounced all sensibility rather choosing to hold tenaciously onto their make-believe world of melt away politics.

It looks as though the laws of physics – that depicts on how like poles repel each other – totally gave way to coincidence in order for similarly charged entities to attract each other in a given magnetic field thereby forming such a strange constellation of resentful -losers – the Berhanu and Andargachew crafted Gunboat-7s. Laughable enough their recent coup de stat attempt at making sense came by way of an interview with the VOA-Amharic program (Part I & II) this month (April 2009). Interestingly, though, Berhanu’s interview – very typical of the kind of sloppy analysis that often boosts the morale of few Diaspora doomsayers – has not received much publicity. Could that be because Berhanu has already outlived his importance even for Gunboat-7 enthusiastic fans? May be yes, may be not. Like Berhanu or despise him, he is a bag of curiosity in his own right; at least a series of his recent radio interview he gave in the USA are.

To say that rigorous analysis has never been Berhanu’s forte is almost to state the obvious. Not surprisingly, the series of radio interviews are all showcases indicating the extent of Berhanu and Andargachew’s anger and the length to which they would go to portray the incumbent government – and harp on the same old TPLF-string in a negative light in anyway they can. To try to focus on all the issues Berhanu and Andargachew raise during their series of radio interviews is very difficult; since most of their talk is downright sloganeering deprived of any substantial solutions whatsoever. They are simply overstuffed with numerous inconsistencies and fallacious claims that I personally refuse to dignify them by their responses. But I think a word or two is well in order to address two topics I believe can mutually exhaust all that can be said of the Gunboat-7 leadership. The first has to do with the version of democracy the likes of Berhanu and Andargachew want to impose on Ethiopia and the mindset that made such arrogance possible in the first place. The second point – also related to the first – has to do with what sort of things the Gunboat-7 leadership thinks – despite the effort to conceal it – Berhanu and Andargachew can and will do to help remove Meles Zenawi’s government and the Gunboat-7’s case for that.

Apart from the usual diatribe against the incumbent regime – most of which was pure sloganeering – the series of their recent radio interviews simply contain a rather childish blather on issues that the two fellows clearly don’t have any grasp whatsoever. Their notion of the process of building democracy could win the Gunboat-7 leadership a name in the annals of the authors of worst political theories. Biting more than they can chew, Berhanu and Andargachew rush back in forth in a mindless rambling all the while drawing strange parallels and making contradictory suggestions in a matter-of-fact ease. For instance, they talk of nationally divisive article-39 stipulated in the incumbent regime’s constitution as legitimate while at the same time talking sustaining of a united democratic Ethiopia. It turns out these two die-hard fellows don’t blink even for a second when it comes to reconciling the irreconcilable; democracy and armed struggle; violence and nonviolence; border dispute with Eritrea; Ethiopia’s legitimate access to the sea through Assab Port; western intervention and independence; the fate of Birtukan Mideksa and what not. Their notions of democracy or freedom are idiosyncratic at best and idiotic at worst. As the series of recent radio interviews reveal Berhanu and Andargachew’s take on the relation between democracy and national stability could have put their fans to shame. As obvious as this patent ignorance is, there must however be a method to their stupidity, if the pattern is any guide. More than anything, the series of radio interviews they give these days reveal tons of materials that point to their eternal marriage with conducting coup de stat or for a take over of power in the notion that the democratic process in Ethiopia can and ought to be remotely controlled by the Western world acting on behalf of Ethiopians (see note # 4).

Living in their comfort zone some ten thousand miles away from Ethiopia Berhanu and Andargachew complain that Europeans and Americans have made it “business as usual with Ethiopia” despite Gunboat-7’s scathing website reports back in the days. The 2-fellows decry the G-8 for inviting PM Meles to their summit “as if he was a respectable leader”. Berhanu and Andargachew hope Barrack Obama will correct the wrongs of his predecessor that they blame for discouraging democracy in Ethiopia. Berhanu and Andargachew claim that George Bush was to blame for what they believe was the reversal of the democratic process, namely – the fact that their power sharing proposal was turned down systematically – because Bush did not force PM Minister Meles to choose democracy over Stability. In parentheses, what does it really mean democracy takes precedence over stability? That democracy can coexist with anarchy? That stability is just an excuse for dictators to cling onto power? It is very difficult to know what exactly these two fellows meant to say; whatever their relentless intentions, however, that kind of idiotic argument is enough to put the two fellows in a class all of their own: they remain in the category of un-teachable political lightweights.

Looks like Berhanu and Andargachew cannot come to terms with the futility of such a bona fide mandate bestowed upon each as the Mayor of Addis Ababa Municipality. They love this title more than any thing else. Berhanu and Andargachew have ever since been tirelessly straining every nerve and muscle to bring what little influence they may have left to bear on the manner the rest of the world conducts itself with the Government of Ethiopia. Now a spent force even in their own chambers, Berhanu and Andargachew seem to have found a consolation of sorts in what they believe is a gathering storm against Meles Zenawi’s government: Gunboat-7 (Berhanu Nega’s May-15 movement). With his Gunboat-7 reports flashed down the toilet as pure nonsense by none other than those who supported their mission in the first place, Gunboat-7’s new-found weapon is an uncanny campaign on behalf of a group of desperados led by their ‘best friend’ Elias Kifle of ER (see note # 5).

But their fanciful rise to the Babylonian heights of king-making was dealt a shattering blow once the two were told they were simply out to grab power by any and by all means. It seems that Berhanu and Andargachew haven’t learned their lessons of Ethiopian history. No amount of domineering by Diaspora Fanatics will ever arm-twist the situation inside Ethiopia into changing the course charted by TPLF by way of remote control from their comfort seats in Diaspora. We should sacrifice ourselves, our time and energy if we want to see change. That was the case yesterday; is the case at the present; and that will always be the case in generations down the road; it means we must force ourselves to delve into doing our home bitter works well enough; before we open our mouths ahead of time. Unfortunately for the good Berhanu and Andargachew, it looks like drawing such lesson has eluded them even four years after that 2005 fateful day of costly gamble has gone once and for all. Throughout the series of recent radio interviews and website reports, they make rather flimsy (or was it phony?) claims that they are going to fight the incumbent regime by all means including waging war. When the real thing comes to the fore, here is Berhanu denying blind-folded as not knowing any of the Gunboat-7 suspects except for one cuisine of his. It is not the superficial disclaimers that matter but the subterranean similarities of their so-called ‘ways out of dictatorship’ for the Ethiopian Opposition with that of Berhanu’s and Andargachew’s protégé-in-exile, Berhanu “Mayor-Elect-of Addis”; Andargachew “X-Mayor of Addis”. That they are working in cahoots with groups with hideous agendas of violence and subversion is anything but hidden. Only the Gunboat-7-people assure all of us to raise our hopes; have the magic wand that can do the tricks in this would-be comprehensive, no-holds-barred Gunboat-7 movement; a harebrained PR stunt Berhanu coughed up to try to explain away his wishy-washy ways of conducting opposition tactics including, but not limited to, waging war against the incumbent regime.

Notes:

1. http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?title=ethiopia_arrests_35_suspects_in_alleged_&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1

2. http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/974#comments;

http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?title=kin_of_exiled_ethiopian_opposition_leade&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1

3. http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/981; http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/978#comments; http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/974#comments;

4. http://ethioforum.org/wp/archives/981;

5. http://mahder.com/fishing-in-troubled-waters-elias-kifles-unabated-servitude-to-issaas-afeworki.html

By Maru Gubena

Some of my readers may think that my tribute upon the untimely death of the phenomenal, the irreplaceable asset of Ethiopia, the unchallenged cultural and musical symbol and the undisputed role model for Ethiopian musicians of my generation, Tilahun Gessese, whom I, as a political economist and organization strategist have characterized not as a “King of Ethiopian Music,” but as “Edilegnaw Niguse,” is too late and perhaps too little as well. But I know it is neither too late nor too little. Because in our Ethiopian culture, families who have lost a loved one and who are grieving and weeping uncontrollably over the sudden loss of their family member, or someone well loved and highly respected by Ethiopians of all ages and sexes, can be extremely happy to receive any condolence at any time, whether written or in person. Yes, all Ethiopian families experiencing such sorrow, always feel tremendously comfortable and happy with the presence of those who come to share their grief and those who come while shading their tears. This is a part of our Ethiopian culture – a culture implanted deep inside our minds and our bodies.

Also, I know I did not write this text early this morning or yesterday evening but last Friday, the 24^th of April 2009, intending to present it in person in my own personal capacity and in my own way, to express my grief and deep sadness at the abrupt disappearance – the death of the Edilegnaw Niguse, Tilahun Gessese, who unquestionably will remain in the hearts and minds of all Ethiopians of all generations. Yes, I wrote this text with the full intention of presenting it in the form of a memorial speech at the memorial service organized for artist Tilahun Gessese by the Association of Ethiopians in the Netherlands, held on Saturday, the 25^th of April 2009. But due to the organizational style, the objectives, and the atmosphere of the event itself, which seemed, at least to me, not to correspond with my objective in presenting my talk, I thought it would be wiser to find other means to express and share my grieve with my Ethiopian compatriots in other ways.

Yes, the highly loved, highly respected icon and cultural asset of our country – Ethiopia – was and is indeed Edilegna Niguse, the Lucky King, and the Extraordinary King of the land of Ethiopia. Artist Tilahun is also Edilegna, because, completely different from our previous Kings and Emperors, Princes and Princesses, he was and is a Niguse of every Ethiopian, with no a single social or political enemy. Not even a single person. Artist Tilahun himself and his images will therefore live and sleep so comfortably and so widely in the hearts and minds of all Ethiopians, including the coming generations. Yes, indeed, he is absolutely different from Ethiopians who have had the highest socio-cultural and political positions within Ethiopian society.

It is also undeniably true that, at least as far as my recollections are concerned, in the past fifty or more years there has never been such an extensive, well organized and most memorable state and people’s funeral service as the one we all saw and witnessed last Thursday, the 23^rd of April 2009 in Addis Ababa. Again, as far as I can recall, Ethiopians have never witnessed such a hugely attended, unforgettable funeral service for any member of Ethiopian society, not for Emperor Haile Selassie, or for his ministers, who had had the highest political positions in the country. Artist Tilahun is just an extraordinary, very special and unique social animal and far more. Not just a musician or singer, but a son, a patriot, a brother, a husband, a father and above all, a loving friend to everyone, all Ethiopians, not just those who live in cities, towns, or villages, but also those who reside deep inside the most complicated Ethiopian forests or its low and high mountains.

Maru Gubena

Readers who wish to contact the author can reach me at info@pada.nl

By Obo Arada Shawl  April 23, 2009

There was/is China for EPLF to emulate

There was Albania for TPLF – a black hole – where no information would escape

There was false-revolution by the DERG that nationalizing would become panacea.

Then, there was/is EPRP that tries to score Political Capital.

At elementary school, he joined the underclass, at high school level, he became an outstanding soccer player, on college level he became a political activist, after his return from abroad he became professionally a decisive liberated man. That was Assegid Wolde Amanuel (AWA).

The PROFESSION

As I have repeatedly attempted to explain, the Eway Revolution should not be confused with that of the Socialist Revolution by the DERG. The Ethiopian polity and policy should be separated when we discuss issues of a national character. The Ethiopian polity of the DERG era was based on the Russian model whereas the economic policy was based on the American system, mainly guided by the IMF and the World Bank.

In other words, the Eathiopian bureaucrats were sandwiched between a political and an economic Revolution. For simplicity, I would like to compare two bureaucrats of a separate ministries, that of a ministry of Transport and Communication and Financial Institution. Of course, the minister of transport & communication was AWA whereas the Governor of Ethiopia’s bank was Tadesse G. Kidan.

Both professional individuals were educated in social sciences that are not exact sciences. Both professionals were not directly involved in the in the Eway Revolution though in politics it is usually about people in large groups and comprises one of the followings

• Ideology – Parties

• Social order – Societies

• Nation – nations

Minister Assegid was leaning towards ideological politics though he was committed neither to MIESO nor to EPRP political structure but he was a keen onlooker about EPRP’s movement for he knew that only political solutions via political parties would bring peace and stability to the nation. Tadesse G. Kidan was more or less was very much looking for the social order of the nation. In other words, both professionals were experts in their fields of study but their fields of study would not make them political leaders but tools or means for transporting goods and services as in the case of Assegid or financial instruments in the case of Tadesse.

It is high time that all ordinary citizens of Eathiopia (HAG) should realize that communications and money are solely tools. At the same time, it more relevant to all politicians to understand that DEMOCRACIA, is a means or tools that guides one to attain its aspiration or goal.

We should not forget that Eathiopia during the DERG era was operating under the concept of militarism and engineering design. Out of the eleven-politburo committee, seven were military men and five of them were engineers. By their training the two categories of militarism and engineering do not possess cool thinking. The Eathiopian masses in (urban areas) under the DERG and the Woyane masses in (rural areas) were involved in dancing that was also an emotional phenomenon. In that aspect, both AWA and TGK were not different than the rest of us in being led by mass emotions.

It is imperative to self analyze what the role of the ምሁር during the eras of emotional distress that was rampant in the DERG’s revolution. I would point out how the Muhur ምሁር አካል was confused and cowed so much so that each blames the other profession without understanding the root cause of their dilemma.

In Marketing as in Architecture (MA- not to confuse with the degree), both professions do support other professions contrary to most Eathiopian professionals. We have witnessed and still are witnessing that one Muhur Akal attempting to demean if not to destroy the other Muhur Akal of a different profession. Why is that, can any one dares to tell us, please?

I can understand though, that since communication and financial operations are difficult to grasp by the common people, the two positions of the two ministers was hard to evaluate.

Take for instance that Professor Getachew Haile, my teacher, and Ayalnesh, my soul mate both praised Governor Tadesse G. Kidan. Why? I believe because both of them have attempted to evaluate TGK from his social order and not from his political ambitions. Because of these evaluation and appreciation, there seems a kind of mistrust among victims of the DERG regime. It’s to be recalled that professor Getachew Haile and Ayalnesh, the Eway Revolutionary, were both victims of the DERG and the TPLF regimes respectively.

Unfortunately, AWA did not write his side of story but TGK did in his book “ብዙ ዐየሁ” albeit he told us half of the story of his service to the DERG.

CONCLUSION

In my first article on AWA, I have quoted from anonymous source the following

It is not about reaching out

It is about holding on to values

It is not about winning or losing battles

It is about achieving objectives

That EPRP should be judged

Assegid Wolde Amanuel and Tadesse Gebre Kidan should be judged by their personal achievement, by their professional accomplishment and by their public services and not via the prism of working within the DERG regime.

For those readers who doubt about the interconnection between the Ethiopian Student Movement, the Eway Revolutionary professionals and the true Public civil Servants, you are encouraged to read “call me by my name: a debate with DEBTERAW, XX that was written and posted on November 17, 2007.

For those first time readers about DEBTERAW, the above article was the last debate with DEBTERAW. We are currently communicating with DEBTERAW in finding lasting solutions for our people and country Eathiopia.

With that background, let me close by quoting the following paragraph from the same article “There is a missing link in EPRA’s history but there is no missing link in the history of EPRP. The struggle of EPRP will continue unabated with or without individual leadership or professorship. It is all about P (principle) and not about B (benefit) or B (blood).”

TRUTH WILL PREVAIL

For comments and questions

woldetewolde@yahoo.com

Postscript

While writing on Assegid’s student political activity, I was told verbally and in written form that I was biased because he was my friend and that I should never praised AWA’s wife for she had violated the customary law of not testifying about one’s husband especially when one is dead. And that she should never raise the issue of his sisters’ dispute. What is your stand on this controversy? Let us discuss.

Maru Gubena

Almost all relatively professional institutions or political organizations see an evaluation – or a brief presentation of policy-related activities or past experience – as a healthy and even vitally important part of both growth and development, whether this involves the general public or individuals who are involved and interested in the organization’s activities. Both large and medium-sized organizations see an evaluation or such a report as tools of understanding, cooperation, integrity, confidence building and a source of motivation for active members and financial contributors. More importantly, it is from an evaluation of outcomes and results, whether intended or unintended, that we draw lessons, learn, and correct or redirect policies and policy-related projects. In some extreme cases, however, and depending on the nature and size of the organization, an evaluation can stimulate or force a leader or leaders to revisit the original vision – the very foundation upon which the organization has been constructed – to see if it can be adjusted and whether the existence of the organization can be maintained.

Whether the policy makers or leadership of a political grouping or organization will begin an evaluation depends a great deal upon the organizational structures and strength that are present. Other more specific factors are also potentially important determinants: the attitude or frame of mind of the leadership, the amount of confidence the leadership has in the functioning of their organization, and, most importantly, the overall capacity of the organization in terms of finance, professional manpower and the amount of output. The production of an evaluation or review of an activity and its release to a given section of the society depends as well upon what can be called “push factors,” which help to stimulate this activity. For example, to what extent do the registered and financially contributing members to the organization or political grouping expect this? Are they interested – do they perhaps even demand to know – the achievements, challenges or failures of the organization they belong to and support? Other factors among the many that can be cited as push factors are governmental and/or non-governmental funding institutions that are entitled to request or even demand that the organization present the overall results of its activities to them and perhaps also to the larger public. Leaders of political parties in economically and politically stable societies, who are often interested in knowing the extent of legitimacy and support they are accorded by the people, do present their evaluations of ups and downs to their members from time to time, often face to face in a huge publicly organized gatherings in the presence of the media so that the general public can participate and form an opinion about the political party – for example, the degree of concern it shows for the wellbeing of the society and how this is demonstrated by its previous engagements and future programmes.

What about the case of the Ethiopian resistance? What do we, as part of its public and as political consumers, know about the historical records of the Ethiopian resistance, and more specifically, about its achievements, challenges and failures? What do we actually know about the complex sources and causes that have been responsible for the failures of repeated efforts made by certain sections of Ethiopian society in attempts to change and shape the socio-economic and political landscape of Ethiopian society? What do we know about what has happened to Ethiopians in general, whose history is said to be so rich and complex and which in the past has been wisely crafted by those who tirelessly and selflessly contributed to it? What do we know about exactly what has gone wrong with the people of Ethiopia, whose forefathers are said to have lived united within bonds of harmony, feared and respected by both friends and enemies? Indeed, as has been expressed in one of my previous articles, Sharing the Sources of my Anxiety, it is not just this author who is troubled; today a good number of Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia bother themselves continuously with the same questions – about what has gone wrong with the so called “modern day” Ethiopians, whose forefathers had both the skills and capacity to negotiate and settle both internal and external differences – issues that matter so much to themselves, their country and people – and who managed to maintain the security of their people and the territorial integrity of their country for centuries? Finally, how do we evaluate the achievements, if any, the challenges and failures of the past thirty or more years of Ethiopian resistance, and come to a relatively clear conclusion, when there is little or no study material or written evaluations and reports?

Also, considering the perspectives for political and leadership change in our country, and given the increasing challenges that face the Ethiopian resistance in this post-Election period – an election held prior to restructuring and reorganization of major institutions of the people, which led to the loss of so many lives and the jailing of elected Ethiopian leaders, and which has come to be seen as the origin of persistent internal feuds and divisions among the opposition parties – does peaceful resistance have a future in Ethiopian politics? (For a more detailed discussion, see the article: The May 2005 Election was Held without Restructuring that is Indispensable for a Free and Fair Election Process, and without Preparing the Ground for Political and Leadership Change.) And given the persistent reluctance of Ethiopians to produce, or even to give space to, political role models with vision, do we seriously believe that the current Ethiopian opposition political parties, especially those in the Diaspora, can reorganize themselves and begin to play an effective role in an effort to galvanize the will, moods and feelings of Ethiopians and help to stimulate the re-emergence of an Ethiopian resistance, now fashioned with rationally constructed mechanisms and wisely crafted bonds of unity? Do they have the means and capacity? How come we tend to believe with such conviction that the Ethiopia resistance can be reshaped and strengthened by the Ethiopian Diaspora, becoming an organization that can succeed in bringing the desired political and leadership changes in our country, while the very foundation – the people, the members of the community – are so divided and hostile to one another, living in communities where sectarianism and parochialism are the norms, the main way that politics play out in Diaspora communities? Isn’t it because of the prevailing chronic sectarianism and parochialism that a disproportionately high number of the Ethiopian Diaspora, and intellectuals in particular, remain reluctant to devote themselves to enthusiastic participation in and leadership of the Ethiopian resistance? Why is it that we are so reluctant, even allergic, to first getting our own house in order, fighting to remove the factors that divide us, democratizing our own frames of mind, developing mechanisms helpful in confidence building among ourselves, building a single, solidly founded Ethiopian Diaspora House that represents and reflects the entire face of the Ethiopian Diaspora and is supported with professional manpower and dependable financial capacity, before engaging in other projects that are beyond our cultural orientations and behaviours? What are the really essential actions we need to carry out – to help ourselves come back to our senses, and to be helpful to ourselves and our people at home?

Further, a good number of Ethiopians hope and expect that the entire population of Ethiopia will soon rise up against the current repressive regime in Addis Ababa. But an important question is: has there ever been a people’s uprising in the history of Ethiopia/Africa? One in which a seated regime has been overthrown simply due to a people’s uprising? If the people can be expected to rise up in Ethiopia, wasn’t the 16^th of May 2005, the day Meles Zenawi ordered the suspension of the vote counting for some weeks (presumably with the aim of snatching the election in its entirety), declared a state of emergency, banned demonstrations including any public gatherings, assumed direct command of the security forces, and replaced, the most appropriate day for a people’s uprising and resistance? Why was there no uprising on this very important day?

Also, as has been observed, some compatriots often speak about armed struggle as a means of achieving their intended goals. But given the end of the Cold War, is armed struggle a feasible way to change a seated and highly militarized Ethiopian/African regime? Since the End of the Cold War, has there been an African country where a change of leadership has occurred by means of a war waged by rebel groups, especially a nation state where the majority of the people have little or no confidence in each other, where individual, family or group interests and short-term outcomes are the order of the day? If not, why then, why on earth do we think this can be achieved, especially by means of the small, unprofessional, disorganized, scattered confrontations in which we tend to engage – confrontations that cause more suffering to our people, but never scare or hurt the intended targets?

Due to the absence of standard but critically important documents – such as data on the formation and cessation of our resistance movements or political parties, lists of names including their founders, those who have been actively involved and those who have made financial contributions, the strategies employed by the leadership and the organizational structures in general, even if these were hazy – any attempt to evaluate the brief general history of the Ethiopian resistance, or even to embark on discourse about it, is an extremely difficult and indeed tricky business. It would nevertheless be important to revisit the historical conditions that provided fertile ground for the rise of Ethiopian resistance, and to cite the cardinal foundations, and to explore at least some of the factors and actors that may have been responsible for the heavy clouds that surround the Ethiopian resistance today. The responses I will give to these complex and lengthy questions and the review of the brief history of the Ethiopian resistance, its achievements, challenges and failures, will therefore be largely based upon my own personal perspectives; day-to-day observations; practical experiences; interactions with and participation in a variety of political and social gatherings; speeches and interviews of Ethiopian political figures and historians; magazine and newspaper clippings, including press releases from Ethiopian political parties; and sporadically held discussions with actively involved Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia.

A brief Summary of the Historical Foundations of the Ethiopian Resistance

A shared desire for freedom and democracy, and an understanding of the possibilities, has not yet developed among many of the people of Ethiopia, or even among those who believe in the need for political and leadership change. However, for over three decades now a good number of Ethiopians have been making every possible effort towards political and leadership change and, at least ideally, encouraging democracy to take root in our country and giving the people an opportunity to test and share its fruits. The observed interest in freedom and democracy is despite the relative political stability that existed soon after the Second World War, and despite the love and respect Ethiopians had for each other, and the confidence they had in themselves. It is additionally true that remarkably healthy socio economic relations and political ties with both the East and West Block countries marked the three decades preceding the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. As various experts in Africa’s political history have often stated, Ethiopia, as a founding member of the League of Nations –now the United Nations – has played an active, substantial role in settling political crisis among and within nation states, and in searching for world peace. According to the historical evidence, Ethiopia’s role and contribution to the process of African decolonization of countries alone has been huge. Indeed, Ethiopia was a center for training and meetings among African freedom fighters and liberators. Throughout the tense and bitter period of struggle to free Africa from the shackles of European colonialism that commenced soon after the Second World War, Ethiopia, the only country in the entire continent with centuries of independence and self rule, was an indispensable house of shelter for world diplomats and negotiators when interchanges were being held between the newly emerging African leaders and representatives of European powers.

Due to Ethiopia’s contribution to global peacemaking and its substantial role in the process of decolonizing African nations as they became independent of the European major powers of the time, Britain and France, Ethiopia and Ethiopians enjoyed the unlimited love and respect of the international community; there was little or no need of visas for Ethiopians to travel to certain European and Middle Eastern countries. Famine in Ethiopia was just a periodic event, a matter of national concern and a collective responsibility of its people. In addition, the number of Ethiopians living in exile numbered only in tens, not in the millions that are undeniably the reality today. The terms “asylum,” “refugee” and “exile” were known only to a few well educated, politically oriented intellectual Ethiopians whose frame of mind was affected by ideas, ideologies and goals related to political, economic and leadership change for Ethiopia. Today, however, these words are well known even to rural Ethiopian children and rural Ethiopian grandmothers and grandfathers, since these phenomena have become indispensable as ways to escape repression, poverty and disease.

Despite the relative economic and political stability that followed the end of the Second World War, the profound confidence Ethiopians had in themselves, and the love and respect of all African countries as well as the international community at large that were being enjoyed by Ethiopia and Ethiopians, the needs and demands of Ethiopian urban populations for political and leadership transition began to manifest itself as early as the 1950s. The December 1960 military coup d’etat launched by the Officers of the Imperial Guard, led by their Commander, Lt. General Mengistu Newaye, and his brother, Girmame Newaye, was an example. Although the attempted coup, nostalgically remembered and referred to as the “December 1960 coup d’etat,” was quickly put down by forces loyal to Emperor Haile Selassie, it left a residue that continued to smoulder in the minds and hearts of certain sections of Ethiopian society, becoming an additional contributor to the eventual collapse of the Emperor Haile Selassie’s government and the foundation of the 1974 Ethiopian revolution.

A retrospective understanding of the factors contributing to the astonishing disintegration of the government of Emperor Haile Selassie would help us to place our situation today in a historical context. However, apart from some immediate family members of the Emperor and those who were fortunate enough to attend the final parliamentary session held on February 27 or 28, 1974 (no exact date of resignation is known), almost no one – probably 99 percent or more of all Ethiopians – knows the exact reasons behind the resignation of Prime Minister Aklilu Habte-Wold’s cabinet. Yet it is this resignation that helped to embolden the members of the Military Committee and their supporters to make further demands and foment actions that led to the subsequent structural crisis within Ethiopian society. Further, as there had never been widespread demands by Ethiopians for an immediate end to Haile Selassie’s regime, the often-heard assumption that the removal of the aging and internationally respected Emperor from power was due to a dramatic uprising of Ethiopians is unfounded. “The political tensions and crises that existed from January to the very day of Aklilu Habte-Wold’s cabinet resignation were nothing compared to the persistent and quite explosive political challenges, combined with armed confrontations – often with deadly results – that have faced and tested the unelected leadership of the TPLF since its arrival in May 1991.” (Maru Gubena, 8 July 2006.)

In logical terms, one would argue that the downfall of Haile Selassie’s government was due to a combination of known and unknown factors; his age too may have made it difficult to deal adequately with the immediate causes, such as the new education policy (known as the “Sector Review”), the 1973-74 drought in Wollo province and the international oil crisis, which affected some sections of the Ethiopian Economy. The other factor that has been cited as an important element was the complete miscalculation (or ignorance) by the Ethiopian’s as a whole about the impact of the crisis itself. Had the Emperor knew that time was working against his government, himself, his family and his people, he would probably have acted vigorously in taking the required measures, for which he still had the power and tools, the support, love and respect both inside Ethiopia and internationally. As this was the first such experience in the history of the country, no one – the former Ministers, other government officials, the Emperor himself or Ethiopians at large – expected that the crisis would move so rapidly or go as far as we have witnessed. Nevertheless, is believed that the Emperor was repeatedly requested, even implored by his generals and immediate family members to take measures to avert the disintegration of his government and the subsequent long-term crisis for the country. But for reasons unknown, and which we probably will never know, he did nothing. As a result, and despite the ardent desire of the people for a democratic system and democratically elected leadership, power was hijacked by resentful, untrained and inexperienced military officers who had neither the vision nor the personal charisma to lead a nation state.

Restrictive political conditions were in place before the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, and these deteriorated exceptionally in the period that followed, the ruthless regime of the Dergue. Organizational and strategic errors made by the then opposition groups and other unexplainable factors exacerbated these conditions. As a result, the people’s resistance under the leadership of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), upon which Ethiopians had firmly laid their hopes and expectations for peaceful political and leadership transition, for a future process of democratization for their country, and for the development of free and democratic institutions, did not last long as a leader of the people’s struggle. The lifespan of EPRP and its meaningful role in Ethiopian politics – and in working towards the dreams of Ethiopians – was short-lived, not only because of the deadly divisions and hostilities between EPRP and MEISON (the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement) – a collaborator with the Dergue, but also due to the lack of multifaceted skills among the young EPRP leadership, who were not experienced in crafting viable, durable political and organizational strategies, including well-thought out tactics for armed resistance. The exceptionally restrictive political and security conditions probably made it impossible for the young EPRP leadership to involve individuals who were highly experienced in the necessary organizational and political fields, and to explore, discuss and debate relevant issues in relative freedom. If that had been possible, workable, durable military strategies and political programmes might have been produced. Instead, every meeting that was attempted had to take place in complete secrecy and often in darkness, in private houses or in the rooms of individual activists, and could only involve those prepared to risk their lives and their families. The military and trained manpower capacity of the “urban military wing” that had been organized to provide immediate, direct protection to individual activists, the leadership of EPRP and its meeting places was far too limited to directly or indirectly challenge the actions or the consequences of the actions of the Dergue, or to confront its complex military power. Given these two problems, it seems likely that the strategies constructed to resist MEISON and the Dergue regime on two fronts – urban and rural – were not well thought out and coordinated. Moreover, the underground urban operations being carried out by EPRP urban units in the major and medium-sized cities of Ethiopia had direct and immediate repercussions on its rural forces and on the leadership of the EPRP as a whole; these had not been foreseen before the urban military activities began. I would also insist on arguing that it was the urban confrontation that enabled the Dergue regime not only to locate and eradicate those EPRP urban unit activists, members of the Urban Defence Committee, the founders or organizers of the urban units, and anyone associated with them, but also, by using information gained from those the regime held and tortured inhumanly and horrendously, the Dergue was able to hunt down and eliminate the top EPRP leadership throughout the rest of Ethiopia.

A good number of Ethiopians who were involved in the resistance, or even those who are simply concerned about the short lifespan of EPRP, will probably continue to be bothered and to ask themselves questions. For example: how did rebel groups such as the EPLF and TPLF survive the heavy-handed measures undertaken by the regime of Mengistu Hailemariam against those opposed to his rule, and eventually succeed in deposing his entire regime, while the EPRP – whose resistance had been embraced by the majority of politically active Ethiopians – did not succeed even in prolonging its struggle? The explanation given above, strategic errors such as the “war on two fronts,” is one logical reason; this contributed to the rapid weakening in the position of the organization. Above all else, however, it was the adoption or incorporation of the political programme of the EPRP – land reform and the establishment of a socialist Ethiopia by the military regime into its own political and economic policy programmes – that created insurmountable internal feuds and conflicts between EPRP activists and its political and military leadership, and was responsible for accelerating the untimely disintegration of the EPRP as a political organization.

Consequently, less than three years after snatching away the people’s struggle for political and leadership change, the Dergue applied its ruthless measures to annihilate its opposition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), its supporters and anyone suspected of being a sympathizer. This heavy handed, cruel and divisive nature of the Dergue regime dashed the hopes and expectations Ethiopians once had for their themselves and their country; even today their long-standing pride, and the confidence they had in themselves and in each other, remains difficult to restore. Consequently, both the country and the people have remained undemocratic and divided. Ever since the time of the Dergue it has been difficult to achieve the reorganization that would allow the establishment of an effective and transparent political process – one that functions democratically and with integrity – that is supported by a good number of Ethiopians, and to see this take root in Ethiopian society. For the same reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of the existence of a democratically organized and professionally functioning Ethiopian resistance since the end of 1970s. The only visible resistance that faced the military regime came from the two rebel groups, the TPLF and EPLF; even though undemocratic, they eventually managed to oust the dictatorial regime of Mengistu Hailemariam in May 1991.

Even given this history and the short period of time that Kinijit had been in existence – and although many technical arrangements among the parties making up the Kinijit coalition had not been worked out before it participated in the May 2005 parliamentary election – many Ethiopians saw Kinijit as a first in the history of Ethiopia: a political party that was relatively democratic, professionally organized, and showed many other hopeful signs, including a highly talented and experienced leadership (See The Changing Face of Kinijit.) This is not to deny the many sincere attempts that have been made by other individuals to establish and lead political parties. I am simply saying that factors related to the culturally framed attitudes, behaviours and visions of those who have established opposition political parties have limited or entirely blocked the possible roles and contributions – which otherwise could have been immeasurably important – of potentially resourceful, knowledgeable and intellectually skilled Ethiopians with many-sided organizational and leadership experience and talents. Instead these political groupings remained remote. Not only were they far from their intended target groups, but also they were less than visible to the society. Part of the problem has been the limited or non-existent possibilities for openness within the organizational structures and policy designs in any of the political parties, whether their aims were narrow or broad; this also depends largely upon the visions and desires, including the democratic or undemocratic attitudes and behaviours, of the founding individuals or leaders and the ways their policies are framed. It is also worthwhile to point out that the spontaneous rise and sudden fall – even disappearance – of a substantial number of these ineffective Ethiopian opposition parties has been due not only to culturally linked elements such as rigidity, arrogance and self-centeredness; other factors have been a lack of involvement, interest and understanding, a limited knowledge of the fundamentals of political and organizational principles and the need for modern organizational structures in political parties, including the components and mechanisms that are required if political parties are to gain ground and become widespread, with permanent acceptance by and support from the target groups and societies.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, one would not be wrong to argue that the fruits of the Ethiopian resistance tasted by a large majority of Ethiopians over the past three or more decades have been bitter. Ethiopians have also been and still are forced to face concurrent tragedies. And, since the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, the face of Ethiopia’s political and economic maps – including the many components that have shaped the new Ethiopian culture and molded the attitudes and behaviours of Ethiopians – have changed dramatically, and in a fashion that has persisted and become difficult either to redirect or to redress. The decades following those periods also saw the beginning of deterioration in the respect outsiders once had for Ethiopia and Ethiopians, to the point where Ethiopians are no longer welcome at ports of entry for a good number of nations that have built rational, solid economic structures and relatively reliable political stability.

Looking at the perspective for political and leadership change in our country, I would certainly not hesitate to point out that the ball has been and is still in our hands, in the hands of all Ethiopians; there is still the potential for us to make up our minds and come together in an effort to heal our deep-seated socio-political fractures and help redirect Ethiopia’s current position both in Ethiopia and within the international community. This seems, at least to me, a question of waiting to see what we want; whether we will be willing to come back to our senses and be prepared to restore, not just our feelings of Ethiopianess and belonging to one another, but also the shattered components of Ethiopia’s culture and the pride of its people. Again, it is my strong conviction that if we, collectively, are to play a meaningful role in helping to clear away the huge clouds surrounding our country and people, to create mechanisms conducive to moving our country from the status of a beggar society to one of self-reliance, this role will be conditioned by, and perhaps depend largely upon, our willingness to fight against the bad and ugly sides of our own culture – but also upon our readiness to engage in the cultivation and development of democratic institutions, confidence building, self-education and self-democratization efforts.

Maru Gubena

Readers who wish to contact the author can reach me at info@pada.nl

● The title and text above provide a brief summary of a larger academic research project and was produced in mid summer 2007, when both the actual climate in the western world and the political temperature within the Ethiopian Diaspora community were too hot, either to engage in the much desired work or to interact positively and freely with our politically active Diaspora compatriots. Consequently, even though the issues discussed in this article are educational and highly relevant to the current issues and discussions, it was not widely published when it was originally written and did not receive the attention the article deserves. Now, as more opportunities seem to have been created, I feel fortunate to be able to once again present this summary to my readers.

By Firdu Yitayew – fyiayew@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, much of Africa has been moving forward. Economic growth is rising, poverty is falling and democratic governance is spreading. But the global financial crisis threatens to undo this progress by reducing investment, exports and aid just as they should be expanding to build on these successes.

While international attention has been understandably focused on events in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Darfur, Somalia and Zimbabwe, countries across Sub-Saharan Africa including Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, and Liberia have been quietly turning around. According to the World Bank, since 2000, poverty rates in these African nations are falling fast, from 58% down to 51% in just six years time.

The key to this progress is stronger African leadership and more accountable governance. Today, more than 15 African countries are democracies, up from just three in the 1980s when the military junta was on power everywhere through coup de estates; they have competitive elections and improved human rights, and their news media are much freer. And, most critical, these countries are relatively at peace.

FORCE VERSUS POWER POLITICS

Force is the opposite of power and relies upon threats of violence, or actual violence to control the behavior of other people. Force puts a figurative or actual gun to your head and makes you do something against your will. Typical enough, TPLF captured and persists to hold power by force; it is not ready to compromise or bargain the power it mainlined and maintained by means of bullets and bloods for electoral votes put into ballot boxes. For TPLF the latter is simply symbolic or nominal put in place as face saving value or window dressing to mystify the onlooker. Needless to say, force is abuse of people. It leads to resentment, and ever-escalating breeding and use of stronger force. That is how and why the TPLF-designated “Supreme Court”, with its minority-view-justices, keeps on creating an end-run around people’s vote. In fact, this incidence is inevitable during the forthcoming 2010 election in Ethiopia.

For those of us who stand on the opposite isle of TPLF’s authoritarian policy the political responsibility we need to shoulder must be based on and strive for a democratic power or real authority; power that is gained as a result of respecting the will of the Ethiopian people; and taking action that derives from the Ethiopian peoples wishes. In the actual political arena, power must be manifested in a manner when a leader responds to the will of those he/she represents. And the process of coming to power must solely be governed by popular votes put into ballots boxes and counted free of fraud. Those Ethiopians who aspire for united Ethiopia must opt for such electoral power that will keep the country in a secured peace and prosperity. We need a popular government that strives for poverty reduction and advocates for the resources, reform, and regulation that Ethiopia need to weather the financial crisis it is persistently facing to this very day.

ETHIOPIA AT CRY AND EMBEDDED CALAMITY

Tragically and paradoxical enough, poor Ethiopia is at a critical stake more than ever. She is at the brinks of disintegrative doom. There is no strong opposition political group that is well structured to take over power and lead Ethiopia in case of any incidental power vacuum left by TPLF. It is a cruel irony if Ethiopia’s future prospects are cut short by a series of ongoing crisis beyond its control. The TPLF government is filled with hypocrites; and does things the way it befits for its own narrow desires and wishes. As a people of a nation we are split and become more and more ethnic focused; family and group oriented; regionalist and undemocratic; with little or no feeling or love for Ethiopia as a nation; and paradoxical enough, we choose to remain in conflict with each other rather than forging semblance and bonds; we seem no longer worrying and looking at the danger zones Ethiopia has already entered into. Leave alone fighting and forcing it out of power; we are no more prepared to rescue and save Ethiopia if and when the TPLF regime decays and falls apart by its own internal upheavals. We are no more prepared to protect Ethiopia in an organized and unified manner from possible disastrous socio-economic situations apparent to get worse at this time of global recession. There is no organizational structure ready to replace TPLF-regime in case one day TPLF dissolves itself from the political arena by its own making. Rather individually we remain contaminated, crying disgustingly; shading crocodile tears; trapped by ethnic mongering as: “running and barking dogs that are unable to bite”; and putting aside our own weak faults for letting TPLF continue its polarization politics unlimited.

MELES ZENAWI – THE POLARAZING PRIME MINISTER

Meles Zenawi’s single-handed polarizing approach challenges and changes the core of his TPLF political identity. His staunch and stubborn manner and divisive ethnic-led messages sicken Ethiopia – a country weary of division, regionalism and family click politics – a nation that keeps on enduring several rounds of both TPLF and its divisive politics; due to lack of organized and firm opposition that stands united to salvage Ethiopia from the yoke of TPLF-tyranny. But Meles Zenawi’s domestic agenda is also resoundingly typical – as though he were some conventionally liberal backbench Prime Minister suddenly thrust into immense influence; which, of course, he is. Following his demagogic dictator Issayas Afeworki’s divisive inculcation, disciple Meles Zenawi found it relatively easy for him and for TPLF to divide and decuple the already latently ethnically gathered and poorly organized opposition coalitions created in all forms both inside and outside the country. For Meles Zenawi it has become smart and easy task, peeling off less-partisan coalition among his loyal opposition groups with seemingly genuine outreaches codified in his hand-made constitution that must be obeyed and okayed by all means and at all times while he or TPLF are in power. Initially several opposition political groups seemed foolishly prepared to accept such short-term challenges to join hands with shrewdly coercive TPLF policy in exchange for long-term ethnically federated responsibility. If Meles was a genuine Ethiopian he could have focused more broadly on resolving Ethiopia’s outlet and access to the sea but in vain; rather Meles opted for creating his dubious Assab Port crisis – the key to all economic recovery – and delayed his ambitions on Eritrean issues to a more realistic time yet to take place. In the process, he championed by getting some loyal opposition stooges to share part of his political risks instead of nursing critical national grievances on the sidelines.

Meles Zenawi’s polarization policy in Ethiopian politics has its own disturbing momentum, aided by some strident loyal opposition voices. But that does not require a prime minister to make it worse. Instead of getting organized to bring TPLF to its knee and take over power as a united force ready to save Ethiopia we seem to fall prey for those preaching divisive politics. Indeed, it is naïve, sad and unnecessary shame that KINIJIT, supposedly the candidate of national unity, has so quickly become another source of ethnic division – where some so called opposition political leaders in Diaspora including the G-7 group led by Berhanu Nega remain wagging their tails at Tyrant Issayas Afeworki’s divisive headquarter in Asmara. As it stands, the working partnership among the recently imprisoned, then released, KINIJIT opposition leaders and the sudden split between those factional groups within them who volunteered to become stooges of Issayas Afeworki’s disintegrative EPLF-mission in Ethiopia and those who aspired for a struggle to contain a united Ethiopia with appalling and persisting war of words; the willingness of majority of Ethiopians to remain divided and keep ourselves concerned with our personal livelihoods, will only propagate the existing unwanted TPLF political regime to spearhead; or else, we will see poor Ethiopia continuing with its disintegration in line with EPLF-TPLF agenda set three decades ago; while we watch ethnic regions falling apart one after the other. It was Eritrea in yester-year; it will be Ogden tomorrow. What next? Divided, we will be heading to fall apart and remain weak. Divided we will remain under TPLF rule for indefinitely; enduring a regime we all seem to hate but not ready to topple off from its centralized power.

THE WAY FORWARD – SETTING-UP ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

As Ethiopians, we are escalating our vibrant nation down to much greater risk of civil war, chaos, and increased tensions and instability. Divided we are falling apart by the day. A case in point is what is happening with our dear sister Birtukan Midekssa and other opposition leader who aspire to see a united Ethiopia. By virtue of their position under a dictatorial TPLF regime, few of the opposition parties try their best struggling to revive democracy in Ethiopia. But their operations are totally dictated by TPLF and forced to condition themselves in TPLF tailored political framework. Ironically, on February 15 2009, Meles Zenawi accused Birtukan Midekssa of banking on support from “powerful friends in powerful positions” – presumably Western nations – when she made the comments during a recent trip to Sweden and Germany. Meles Zenawi mockingly said: “That message I think is a very dangerous political message to convey in an emerging democracy. The rule of law and equality involves everyone.”(1) As we all know Birtukan is languishing in prison under TPLF’s “life-imprisonment” sentence due to our weakness. We are disorganized and help further disorganization by preaching on or contributing to divisive politics. This introversive, narrow, short-sighted political outlook and wrong path must be halted and closed.

The Ethiopian crisis, to which TPLF has done much to cause since 1991, demands a strong response. As a people belonging to a nation we Ethiopians must do our part by continuing to address the current irreconcilable political frameworks and reduce obstacles to Ethiopia’s mere existence as a nation. Strong action by Ethiopians in Diaspora and robust support from the Ethiopian opposition groups inside Ethiopia – that accepts an alternative Ethiopian government in exile – can keep Ethiopia’s fast recovery and guarantee a secured option for demanding change. Indeed, this is an alternative and viable hope for forging a ground for cooperation of different political parties in Ethiopian taking us all to the next stage of stabilizing the country maintain peace. As a united opposition groups we must try to set up an Ethiopian government in exile, bring down TPLF to its knee, and reinstate the country’s economic advantages in place both systematically and strategically without creating havoc or power vacuum. To this end, both should continue to do their part.

A CALL TO ETHIOPIANS IN DIASPORA

In what follows I make my humble and personal appeal, which I hope will be supported by all Ethiopians from whatever political or civic persuasion. It is a straight forward matter of Saving Ethiopia and saving those imprisoned while struggling for human rights violation in Ethiopia. As well known, Birtukan Medekssa did not commit any crime or transgression of any law in the Ethiopian legal nomenclature, but to stand for her rights as a citizen. She persistently fought for the silent majority Ethiopians at home and abroad.

To cut the long story short, my humble appeal in particular goes to Ethiopians in Diaspora, who believe in rescuing our beloved and only nation and its people from the dangers looming over our heads for a likely power vacuum taking place incidentally. My plea is to those Ethiopians in Diaspora to come together at this high time and create a platform that ensures creation of an alternative Ethiopian government in exile urgently by networking across the different continents, gathering of potential persons at nodal points designated as the hubs for meetings and struggle for Ethiopia’s mere survival as a nation.

The Ethiopian Diaspora community needs to revive as a collective, united and harmonious force with a single face, a community that is respected of its activities, and playing a meaningful role that contributes to mending bridges among Ethiopians and alleviating Ethiopia’s multiple, prolonged sufferings inflicted by the EPLF-TPLF exertion and efforts. Better late than never, the Ethiopian Diaspora political apparatus must function in organized and strategic fashion and pull itself out of its reputation of being nothing more than –“running and barking dogs that are unable to bite.”

United we can win international recognition and prepare ourselves strongly either to take over power or fill any eventual power vacuum at any time of emergency crisis. We should not lament till the 11^th hour as we did in yester years; and start bragging left and right when the time is ripe enough for eventual change; or the time is too late to cure the damages yet to be inflicted upon Ethiopia. Obviously, by virtue of our position in Diaspora, we do have all the time and all the freedom to organize and lead a strong and alternative opposition government in exile that advocates for Ethiopia’s fraternal rights to exist as a nation with its legitimate access to the sea. If we don’t stand for our nation, we will fall for everything! We must learn from past errors and stand vigilant not to be taken by surprise when the unwanted funnies happen in front of our naked eyes. We should keep ourselves away from any divisive teachings or divisive elements preaching to realize atomized tens and hundreds of mini-states.

Creating an alternative Ethiopian government in exile will help us maintain and expand our long-established positive cultural elements and use these to fashion a new democratic political culture, extending our cultural patterns to include habits of working and living together with accountability and responsibility. It will permit us not only to win over the forces and processes of future socio-economic and political changes in Ethiopia, both directly and indirectly, but also to play an indispensable part, with a meaningful, positive, substantial role in helping and defending each member of the Ethiopian population in times of personal or collective difficulty, no matter how severe it may be.

Note: (1) http://ethiopolitics.com/news_1/20090215824.html

Mankelklot Hale Selassie (PhD) – April 10, 2009

Webster New World Dictionary defines opportunism as the practice or policy of adapting one’s  actions, judgments, etc. to circumstances, as in politics, in order to further one’s immediate interests, without regarding for basic principles or eventual consequences.  (Webster New World Dictionary of the American Language. Second College Edition). See if you can find the trend in the argument I am going to share below.

There are two camps in Ethiopia today. The camp that belongs to the people of Ethiopia and the camp of Meles and his collaborators. In my opinion, in Ethiopia, today, this is the major irreconcilable contradiction. Due to the nature of the contradiction it can only be resolved by an up-rise,  as I have been saying for a long time, not by compromise or through negotiations. As long as organizations remain in Meles’s camp, by extension inside Medrek,   the people of Ethiopia will see them as organizations against its interests and its aspirations. They have to come out clearly, with no strings attached, not one foot inside Meles’s camp and the other outside the camp. From the outset, AEUP was, and still is inside the people’s camp. AEUP rejecting Medrek did not surprise me. I was expecting it to reject it. It did a commendable job.

Medrek is actually a barn (beret) constructed and controlled by Seye Abrha and Gebru Assrat. Ultimately, these TPLFites, the gate keepers, are the ones who would tell when to come out of the barn, when to feed, where to feed, where to drink water, and finally when to go back to the barn. By the way, the parliament in Ethiopia is the other mother of all barn (beret), fully controlled by Meles and his mafia group.

In my opinion the only formidable opposition force in Ethiopia is AEUP. It is a party that has the potential to form a coalition government and run the country. The manner it performed, with discipline and with the full confidence that the people will win , before, during, and at the election of May 15, 2005, attests to that fact. And, please note this. When Western countries deliberately, with the full knowledge what Meles and his collaborators did to the election of May 15, 2005, and that divisively  shun a formidable opposition force, particularly a nationalist,  in a country where a ruthless and blood sucking individual is at the helm, it is a good sign that that organization is in good stand with the people, not bowing to leak the feet of the dictator. An opposition that questions the legality of Article 39 would not be in a favorable position with the Western countries, particularly with those who conspired for the separation of Eritrea. The major role player being the government of the United States of America.

Bottom line, AEUP has the potential to repeat what it did before the election of May 15, 2005. Therefore, it is important to focus on AEUP and build it up. Encourage it to do better and more when its actions are positive, and offer it constructive criticism when it goes wrong.

Medrek, which is composed of opportunists and with those of specific motives, is inside the camp of Meles and his collaborators. To find out whether some of those who joined it are opportunists or not, read what they wrote, and listen to what they said. The bottom line of these opportunist’s action is nothing but the collaboration with the regime, the enemy of Ethiopia and its people. One can boldly say, that, sharp and decisive political struggle would not and could not be fought while these opportunists are in the field of the struggle. They would be satisfied if Meles won again. They get their monthly salary on time. They live comfortably. Their children go to school with full protection. Their health is protected, because they can afford to have the top treatment. So, there is nothing they would lose if the current regime continues to rule. Perhaps this could be their daily prayer. These are termites. And they are on the rise too.

The rise of opportunism hence opportunists is the expansion of Meles’s camp, hence the struggle between the people of Ethiopia and Meles becoming vicious and brutal. They aught to be cleaned up by an up-rise. In the mean time they aught to be targeted. An up-rise is the only instrument, handy, to uproot Meles and his mafia group. Of course the opportunists would fight it out, to the hilt, for an up-rise not to take place. Because, if it did, it is going to sweep them out like a hurricane does to what ever is in its way. In my opinion, armed struggle would take time. Because, as I have indicated in my previous articles, time is the essence of the struggle in Ethiopia. The longer Meles rules the more the destruction.  You don’t give time for an enemy bent to tear down the unity of Ethiopia. Here is what this entrenched and sworn enemy of the unity of Ethiopia stated in 1991. He started it with a lie too. “A feudal monarchy and a repressive dictator couldn’t hold Ethiopia together,… Now we are trying another way. If Ethiopia breaks apart, then it wasn’t meant to be.“ Time, November 4, 1991. A leader whose would be interest is the well-being of the nation he is going to lead would not in the first place run an experiment, particularly when the country is made up of over eighty ethnic groups. Please read the first statement and see whether it was true or not. Was Ethiopia breaking apart during Haile Selassie’s rule? Was Ethiopia breaking apart during Mengustu’s rule? A blatant lie.

I have also shared my opinion a number of times regarding armed struggle. What is baffling is that why those pursuing armed struggle do not try to combine it with an up-rise? They are inside Ethiopia. They have the potential to disguise and  move from place to place inside the country and organize the people. I think it is time to be bold, be creative and combine these two strategies of struggle.

By the way, not to join them does not mean not to talk to them. Keep the line open and try to sway them. At least to make them not to interfere in the field would be a wise tactical move.
Mankelklot Hale Selassie (PhD)

April 10, 2009

By Wolde R. Tewolde    April 9, 2009

It is not about reaching out

It is about holding on to values

It is not about winning or losing battles

It is about achieving objectives

That EPRP should be judged

Anonymous

This article is the first in a three part series depicting Assegid Wolde Amanuel, the student, the professional and the public servant. AWA died on USA soil but was buried in Addis Ababa on March 29, 2009. This is a tribute and a testimony of a patriot who was misunderstood not only by his friends, colleagues and foes alike but also by his own sisters. Besides, many living murhuran would hopefully understand how the Eway Revolution – the very tenet that Assegid stood for – was and is functioning. By doing so, I hope that AWA and many others like him would be exonerated from the wrong perception perpetuated by all living Eathiopian souls. In addition, this may open up a dialogue with ምሁራን Muhuran versus ጽንሃተ ምሁራን Tsinhate Muhuran.AWA’s funeral service was held at St Michael’s church two weeks from today. Assegid was still popular even in his death. There is no better testimony than his wife and the church clergy who eulogized him to the best of their knowledge about AWA.

Background

Assegid W. Amanuel and I have nicknames for each other. He used to address me as a Wollamo and I used to address him as a Dorze. Why did we address each other in that manner? My own experience with Assegid was during a football match when I have observed Assegid playing football on barefoot while it was raining. Gayo Haleke, the Godson of Germame Neway and Assigid were my favorite soccer players. Although both were playing barefoot and my eyes fell on Assigid’s. That was when and then that I related AWA to the Dorze ethnic whom I saw mixing mud with sand with their bare feet. I bluntly asked whether Assegid belonged to this ethnic group and he bluntly responded as if I was a “Wollamo.” Since that day, we had very close and warm relationships.

In other words, I have read his feet and he had read my face – physical readings. It was because of Assegid that I have maintained to tell to everyone and everybody that my mother had deliberately created scars on my face that would be equivalent to a car tag so that nobody will have difficulty in identifying me. I am glad that I have a definite identity since Assegid’s reminder. Assegid was not angry when I had addressed the way I did and I think he told me that he was one of them – a hard working people. For some period of time, I did believe him. This image reading was so destructive that thousands died or lived in anger. As we went to college our scopes had widen and literature readings have helped us all to change our attitude towards one another.

The Ethiopian Student Movement liberated us to be open and address the way we feel, of course with no qualms or malice towards none. But later on, from physiological to behavioral reading came to our senses and we had developed this name calling to a higher-level while in colleges and professional fields. For us and for thousands like us, to say Dorze, Wollamo, Agame, Galla, Amara, Gurage, Kimante, Tigri, Shankla or any other name-calling did not mean a thing. We were liberated from our ignorance not so because of available curriculum study or books written about sociology on Ethiopia but because of our engagement in the Ethiopian Student Movements, in sports and of course later on as a result of our working with the Eathiopian rural population.

But when I met Assigid in Washington, DC, I addressed him the way I did in Ethiopia. Assigid told me that things back home have become serious and advised me not to use such languages. What has happened? I asked him. Assegid told me only “ነገሩ የምር ሆነዋል” That was the end of that. We parted – he went to Ethiopia and I remained in America. One can compare this name-calling based on phonology with that of today’s addressing one another based on ethnicity and language. What a tragedy!!!

General Wingate High School

For those readers, who do not know about Wingate – he was the major leading a small British –led regular force known as “the Gideon Force”. Orde Wingate joined with the irregular Ethiopian patriots fighting the Italian occupation in Ethiopia. After the defeat of the Italians during the 2^nd World War, Haile Sellasie I allowed to be named this prestigious high school after the British General.

What did this school produce? What kind of school was it? Who are the alumni? Where are they now? Have they contributed to the development of Eathiopia yet? Or to the destruction of Ethiopia? Although, the school is my alma mater, I have not appreciated the contribution of its alumni to Eathiopia’s development, especially when the school at the time was supposed to be on par with that of Harvard in USA, Oxford in Britain or Sorbonne in France.

Orde Wingate left Ethiopia without bidding goodbye to Emperor Haile Sellasie I. Writing on Wingate, Wikipedia put the following” Wingate was most concerned about British attempts to stifle Ethiopian Freedom, writing that attempts to raise future rebellions amongst populations must be honest ones and should appeal to justice.”

The British government – the sponsor of the school, had a good system of running the school. We were highly trained to be disciplined, respectful and responsible citizens of what country I do not know. After graduation, some left for England, some to France and others to the USA. I cannot account all those who went abroad for further studies. But Assigid was one of those who went back to serve his country and people and he did in his profession until his sickness took his life.

Assegid W. Amanuel as a bureaucrat in road transport

The first progressive graduate students were employed in the Ethiopian Road Transport Administration. It was the first test of their progressiveness. The sector of road transport was the ideal place for becoming rich albeit through corruption. But none of the graduate bureaucrats became corrupt officials. On the contrary all of them became careful not to indulge in any corruption. And what was interesting everyone and everybody were working in harmony and served the public in honesty and efficient manner. In my view, these graduates were the first group who honestly and diligently embraced to enter the old bureaucracy and change it upside down for good. In other words, Road Transport was a place for the continuation of the Eathiopian Student Movement by other means.

But who were these people besides Assegid? It was better for me to name them in accordance to my visits when I usually enter their respective offices. Amazingly, they were paired in their ethnic backgrounds. Assegid was housed with Lulseged both from Harrar affiliation; Ibsa Gutema and Bekele Geleta both from Wollega region sitting in one room; Gebru Mersha sitting with Yirga Tessema from Gurage region and Wallellign Makonnen and Sine sitting together. These five pairs I used to visit and have coffee or tea in their respective offices addressing them in their ethnic nicknames and we were all enjoying it. Deep inside, we were coming to together for a long haul to help the Eathiopian people for a fundamental change. And we did and still we are continuing the long struggle. I believe most of my readers know the whereabouts of these individuals and what they have done to the betterment of Eathiopia.

While working at the Commercial bank, I had come with many businessmen and bankers, but it was no match for my desire to quench the modern young bureaucrats that I have observed in the transport sector. The working relationship of these graduate students had given me a great hope for any kind of development that would have taken place in Ethiopia. I learnt right there that there was hope and desire for progress provided that certain dedicated individuals were allowed to exercise their power in government to bring a positive change. The type of bureaucracy that was in them was almost perfect. It was a model for me and probably for thousands of Eathiopians. Of course, one major part of their success story was because of their boss by the name Ato Shimellis Adugna. He gave them the power and the choice to conduct their daily business. That model of coming out fresh from a university, serving businessmen, the government and above all the public should have been emulated. I believe also that many have somehow followed their bureaucratic path.

It was undeniable that if not all, most of these young bureaucrats have continued to change the political landscape of Ethiopia simultaneously on a professional as well as on political levels.

It was in this setting that Assegid should be viewed as an expert in transportation and later on communications sectors. He was one of the best whom I call Tsinhate Muhur Akal. Why do I say this? Because, Assigid lived the live of the poor, he knew the living conditions of the land lords, and he understood the need of transport and communications in the country. He acquired the knowledge to qualify him to be a transport expert and all that was required of him was to put it in practice. For this, he was blamed for not helping his friends and relatives to become rich. Assegid was there to help when help was needed, I would think that he had helped his classmates to have jobs but that does not make him a corrupt person. It was a noble thing if he had assisted the Wingaters provided that they were qualified for the task demanded but not at the expense of the public trust. What I do not understand is that why some people complain that has worked with the DERG. Why cannot we understand that people work for their profession? Let us compare AWA’s public service with that of the banker’s (governor) profession of Tadesse G.K.

In reality, Assegid has helped the movement of people and goods from one region to another. We are were we are because, we have seen one another, fought against each other, exchanged goods and services and we even have communicated with one another. Isn’t this phenomenal? I think it is. One can argue that he facilitated the logistics of military and forced resettlement of people from the highlands to the low lands. But that was another matter. Neither the war policy nor the resettlement policy would have involved Assegid WA. He might have been a communist cardholder by default. AWA’s name should be deciphered as a person who volunteered to be a public servant and who had hoped to vote for a final victory (VVV). He died without seeing his wisdom (VV) being implemented. I hope his children will witness his vision and mission being accomplished. God Bless his soul.

TRUTH WILL PREVAIL

woldetewolde@yahoo.com